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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1978, Congress amended the Age Discrimination in Em
ployment Act (ADEA).l The Department of Labor's Wage and
Hour Division and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis
sion (EEOC) subsequently promulgated in 1979 interpretative reg
ulations concerning those amendments. 2 The combined legislative
1. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, 29
U.S.C.A. §§ 621, 623, 624, 626, 631, 633a, 643 (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amending 29
U.S.C. H 621-634 (1976» (hereinafter referred to as the 1978 amendments) amended
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976), as
amended by 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621, 623, 624, 626, 631, 633a, 634 (West Cum. Supp.
1979) (hereinafter referred to as ADEA).
2. A chronology of regulations which have been proposed or promulgated by
the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor (hereinafter referred to as
Department of Labor) and more recently by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) will be of assistance to the reader. The Department of Labor
Interpretative Bulletin concerning the ADEA, originally appeared at 33 Fed. Reg.
9172 (1968) (presently codified at 29 C.F.R. § 860 (1978». After the enactment of the
1978 amendments, the Department of Labor decided to publish a series of regula
tions interpreting different aspects of the ADEA. The key interpretative regulation
concerns ADEA § 4(f)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1976), as amended by 29 U.S.C.A. §
623(f)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (hereinafter § 4(f)(2» and its consequences for em
ployee benefit plans. The § 4(f)(2) regulation appeared in proposed form in Septem
ber 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 43,264 (1978) (hereinafter referred to as Proposed Interpreta
tive Bulletin). The § 4(f)(2) regulation appeared in final form in May 1979. 44 Fed.
Reg. 30,647 (1979) (hereinafter referred to as the Final Interpretative Bulletin). Still
forthcoming are EEOC Guidelines on § 4(f)(2). See note 6 infra.
Anoth,er important regulation considers § 12(c)(I) which constitutes the principal
exception to the general requirement of the 1978 amendments establishing 70 as the
mandatory retirement age. 29 U.S.C.A. § 631(c)(l) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amend
ing 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1976». Section 12(c)(I) permits the mandatory retirement at age
,65 or later of bona fide executives and high policymaking employees receiving an
nual retirement benefits of $27,000 or more. The Department of Labor published its
proposed interpretation of § 12(c)(I) in December 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,147 (1978).
The EEOC republished it with minor modification in November 1979 as a final in
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and regulatory actions require significant changes in the personnel
practices of, and the employee benefit plans 3 sponsored by, pri
vate sector employers. Although the 1978 amendments became
effective for most employers on January 1, 1979, 4 it is the recent
terpretation. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791 (1979). For a discussion of the § 12(c)(l) exception
see text accompanying notes 248-92 infra.
.
.
Another exception to the mandatory retirement age of 70 is ADEA § 12(d), 29
V.S.C.A. § 631(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amending 29 V.S.C. § 631 (1976)), which
provides a temporary exception until July 1, 1982 for employees age 65 to 70 serving
under a contract or similar arrangement of unlimited tenure, at an institution of
higher education. The Department of Labor proposed its interpretation of § 12(d) in
December 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,153 (1978). The EEOC republished it with minor
modification in November 1979 as a final interpretation. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791 (1979).
The § 12(d) exception is of limited interest and is not further considered in this
article.
Finally, the EEOC has proposed an interpretation of involuntary retirement: 44
Fed. Reg. 68,858 (1979). For a discussion of involuntary retirement see text accompa
nying notes 238-47 infra.
3. Although the term "employee benefit plan" is used in ADEA § 4(f)(2), 29
V.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1976), as amended by 29 V.S.C.A. § 623(f)(2) (West Cum. Supp.
1979), it is not defined anywhere in AD EA. The term is defined, however, in the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 3(3), 29 V.S.C. § 1002(3) (1976). The
Department of Labor, however, rejected the use of this definition because it encom
passes plans which provide benefits whose cost does not increase with the age of the
participants. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,650 (1979). For a discussion of the Department of La
bor's narrower definition of employee benefit plan see text accompanying notes

554-64 infra.
4. The 1978 amendments § 2(b), 29 V.S.C.A. § 631(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979)
(amending 29 V.S.C. § 631 (1976)), eliminated the 65 mandatory retirement age for
most affected employees in private industry as well as state and local government
employees on January 1, 1979.
For employees whose mandatory retirement was required or permitted by a col
lective bargaining agreement in effect on September 1, 1977, the mandatory retire
ment age of 65 expired on the earlier of January 1, 1980 or the termination date of
the collective bargaining agreement. [d.
There is already a controversy concerning the involuntary retirement prior to age
65 pursuant to the terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan which occurred prior
to the effective date of the 1978 amendments. The Department of Labor and the
EEOC take the position that involuntary retirement prior to age 65 pursuant to a re
tirement plan adopted or amended after 1967 has been illegal since the enactment of
the ADEA in 1967. 44 Fed. Reg. 68,859 (1979). The Federal agencies and aggrieved
employees, however, have had mixed success in convincing Federal courts of the
correctness of their position to retroactively apply the 1978 amendments prohibiting
involuntary retirement. See Marshall v. American Motors Corp., 475 F. Supp. 845
(E.D. Mich. 1979); Kuhar v. Greensburg-Salem School Dist., 466 F. Supp. 805 (W.D.
Pa. 1979); Davis v. Boy Scouts of America, 457 F. Supp. 665 (D.N.J. 1978). Contra,
Marshall v. Atlantic Container Line, 18 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. 1167 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Marshall v. Delaware River & Bay Auth., 471 F. Supp. 886 (D. Del. 1979); Marshall
v. Baltimore & 0 R.R., 461 F. Supp. 362 (D. Md. 1978).
Since the ADEA § 4(f)(2), 29 V.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1976), as amended by 29
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publication of the Department of Labor's Interpretative Bulletin
concerning age discrimination in employee benefits, rather than
the amendments to the statute, which will cause employers to con
sider revising their pension and welfare benefit plans to conform to
the new requirements. The Interpretative Bulletin was published
on May 25, 1979. 5 Its finality, however, pas been diminished by
the transfer of jurisdiction over ADEA to the EEOC which is
planning to publish its own guidelines. 6 While the EEOC is con
sidering further changes in its guidelines for retirement, it supports
the general principles and most of the specific rules expressed by
the Department of Labor in the final Interpretative Bulletin. 7
The promulgation of the Interpretative Bulletin represents the
most significant expansion of federal regulation affecting employee
benefit plans since the enactment of the Employee Retirement In
come Security Act (ERISA) in September 1974. 8 The Department
of Labor and the EEOC, however, have published interpretations
with only slim authority in statute or the legislative history of the
ADEA and the 1978 amendments. 9 Many attorneys and most em
ployers are unaware of the new regulations and have not reviewed
U.S.C.A. § 623(f)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979), Interpretative Bulletin did not appear
until five months after the January 1, 1979, effective date, the Department of Labor
and the EEOC made limited concessions as to the date on which compliance was re
quired. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,647 (1979). See text accompanying notes 121-300 infra.
5. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120 (1979).
6. Section 2 of Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg.
19,807, transferred on July 1, 1979, all functions relating to the administration and
enforcement of the ADEA, as amended by the 1978 amendments, from the Secretary
of Labor to the EEOC. Although the EEOC concurred with the Department of
Labor's Interpretative Bulletin on ADEA § 4(f)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1976), as
amended by 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(f)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (in fact, the EEOC staff
participated in its drafting), the EEOC announced in July 1979 that it will not adopt
the Department of Labor's Interpretative Bulletins and will publish its own guide
lines on the AD EA. Compare 44 Fed. Reg. 30,657 (1979) with id. at 37,974. (EEOC
announcement of intent to issue new guidelines). The EEOC announced that em
ployers may continue to rely upon Department of Labor Interpretative Bulletins and
Wage and Hour opinion letters until new guidelines are published by the EEOC. [d.
at 37,974.
7. Speech of EEOC Vice-chairman Daniel E. Leach to the Southern Pension
Conference in Williamsburg, Virginia (Nov. 15, 1979), reprinted in Legal Times of
Washington, Nov. 26, 1979, at 17, col. 1 (hereinafter referred to as Leach's Speech).
See Huffman, EEOC Mulls About-Face On Pension Accruals, Legal Times of
Washington, Oct. 22, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
8. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1003,
1021-1031, 1051-1061, 1081-1086, 1101-1114, 1131-1144, 1201-1204, 1221, 1222, 1231,
1232, 1241, 1242, 1301-1309, 1321-1323, 1341-1348, 1361-1368, 1381 (1976) (herein
after referred to as ERISA).
9. See notes 18-20 infra.
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their employee benefit plans in light of them. Perhaps this inac
tion indicates a growing indifference to the ever increasing federal
regulation of the private sector.
This article has four focuses. The first section focuses on the
degree of deference which the Interpretative Bulletin and future
EEOC Guidelines are entitled to in light of the ADEA, its legisla
tive history and other laws affecting employee benefit plans. The
second section considers the general principles expressed in the In
terpretative Bulletin. The third section analyzes in detail the appli
cation of the Interpretative Bulletin to specific employee bene
fit plans. The fourth and final section suggests how employers and
their attorneys should approach their task of reviewing their em
ployee benefit plans.

II.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S INTERPRETATIVE BULLETIN AND
EEOC's GUIDELINES-A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE

The ADEA, since its original enactment in 1967, has prohib
ited employers from diSCriminating against employees on the basis
of age. Prior to the enactment of the 1978 amendments, the prohi
bitions against employment discrimination were limited to individ
uals 40 to 65 years of age, the so-called "protected age groUp."10
The principal changes made by the 1978 amendments were to
strike down involuntary retirements because of age l l and to extend
the upper limit of the pr()tected age group to 70. Otherwise, the
Act is essentially the same as when originally enacted. 12
The Act forbids an employer to "discriminate against any indi
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or priv
ileges of employment, because of such individual's age. "13 Section
10. ADEA § 12,29 U.S.C. § 631 (1976).
11. The 1978 amendments, §§ 2(a), 5(a), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 623(£)(2), 631(a), (West
Cum. Supp. 1979) (amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(f)(2), 631 (1976)). Other changes
were: Elimination of any mandatory retirement age for most Federal employees; ad
dition of the right to a jury trial on issues of fact regarding the recovery of amounts·
owing as a result of a violation of the ADEA; elimination of the notice of the Depart
ment of Labor intent to sue for a violation and its replacement with a charge; and
tolling of the statute of limitations during conciliation efforts. The 1978 amendments
§§ 5(a), (e), 7(c)(I), (d), (e)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(c), (d), (e), 633(a) (West Cum. Supp.
1979) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 633(a), (d), (e) (1976).
12. In 1974, the ADEA was amended to include within the scope of its cover
age federal, state and local government employees (other than elected officials and
certain aides not covered by civil service) and to expand coverage from employers
with 25 or more employees to employers with 20 or more employees. ADEA §
28(a)(I)-(4), 29 U.S.C. § 630(b), (c), (f) (1976).
13. ADEA § 4(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(l) (1976). Private sector employers cov
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4(f)(2) of the ADEA is the key exception to this broad protection
against employment discrimination based on age. 14 Prior to the en
actment of the 1978 amendments, section 4(f)(2) provided:
(f) It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency,
or labor organization . . . (2) to observe the terms of . . . any
bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension,
or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the pur
poses of this [Act], except that no such employee benefit plan
15
shall excuse the failure to hire any individual.

The reason for the 1978 amendment to section 4(f)(2) was to
overturn legislatively the United States Supreme Court's decision
in United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann.1 6 The Court permitted the
involuntary retirement because of age of an employee within the
protected age group if the retirement was pursuant to a bona fide
employee benefit plan. 17 As part of the 1978 amendments, Con
ered include any business engaged in an industry affecting interstate commerce with
at least 20 employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in
the current or preceeding calendar year. ld. § ll(b), 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976).
Whether affiliated businesses are considered one employer or several distinct em
ployers is a question of fact turning on the degree of control exercised by one affili
ate over the others. See, e.g., Woodford v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 369 F. Supp. 911
(N.D. Ga. 1973); Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 362 F. Supp. 1156 (D. Neb. 1973),
afI'd, 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974).
14. There are three other important exceptions to the general prohibition
against discrimination based upon age. First, employers with less than 20 employees
are not subject to ADEA. ADEA § ll(b), 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976). Second, an em
ployer may discriminate based upon age "where age is a bona-fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the operation of the business ...." ld. § 4(f)(1),
29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976). An employer who seeks to use age as a bona fide occu
pational qualification (BFOQ) must show (i) that the BFOQ is reasonably necessary
to the essence of the employer's business and (ii) have a factual basis for believing
that older applicants would be unable to perform the job or that it is impractical for
the employer to judge the individual ability of each job applicant on an individual
ized basis. See generally Arritt v. Grissell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977); Usery v.
Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976); Aaron v. Davis, 414 F.
Supp. 453, reconsid. denied, 424 F. Supp. 1238 (E.D. Ark. 1976). The proposed
EEOC Interpretation simply states that the BFOQ exception involves a facts and cir
cumstances issue which is to be narrowly construed and the burden of proof of es
tablishing the BFOQ is the employer's who relies on it. Proposed Interpretation 29
C.F.R. § 1625.6 (1979). Third, an employer may discharge an employee for "good
cause." ADEA § 4(b)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 623(b)(3) (1976).
15. 29 U.S.c. § 632(b)(2) (1976).
16. 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
17. Prior to the enactment of the 1978 amendments, most employers had retire
ment plans estab!ishing the age of involuntary retirement at age 65, the normal re
tirement age under their retirement plans. Since age 65 was outside of the then
protected age group of 40 to 64, the question of age discrimination because of invol
untary retirement within the protected age group rarely arose. A few employers,
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gress superseded the McMann decision by adding a new final
clause to section 4(£)(2). It provided: H[N]o such seniority system or
employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary re
tirement of any individual specified by section 631(a) of this title
[an employee between the ages of 40 and 70] because of the age of
such individual. "18
In order to take advantage of the section 4(£)(2) exception and
provide lesser benefits to older workers, an employer must demon
strate: (i) The plan is bona fide; (ii) the lower benefits are provided
in observance of the terms of a plan; (iii) the plan is not a subter

however, established retirement plans with a normal retirement age of less than age
65. The issue arose as to whether § 4(f)(2) exempted the employer from the general
prohibition against discrimination in employment. Three circuit courts of appeals ad
dressed this issue. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit con
strued § 4(f)(2) to permit the involuntary retirement, solely on the basis of age, of the
employee within the protected age group, although the employer could not establish
the economic costs to the plan. Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th
Cir. 1974). In Brennan, the Fifth Circuit held that retirement based solely on age
was permitted by the terms of an employee benefit plan which was established prior
to the ADEA thereby "eliminating any notion that [the plan] was adopted as a sub
terfuge for evasion." Id. at 215. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reached a contrary conclusion in Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir.
1977), cer!. denied, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978), upholding an involuntary retirement under
an employee benefit plan based upon forced retirement of an employee within the
protected age group was permitted by § 4(f)(2) only if "legitimate considerations
other than an employer's preference for youth justified the forced retirement[s]." Id.
at 222. An involuntary retirement provision, the Court said, must have "some eco
nomic or business purpose other than arbitrary age discrimination." Id. at 221. The
third and most important case to consider the issue was McMann v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 434 U.S. 192 (1977). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that § 4(f)(2) resolved in the neg
ative the issue of whether an employee within the protected age group can be
mandatorily retired pursuant to the terms of a bona fide non-subterfuge employee
benefit.
In order to resolve these conflicting interpretations of § 4(f)(2), the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in McMann. The Supreme Court in United Air Lines, Inc. v.
McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977), held that the ADEA was not intended to invalidate
retirement plans instituted in good faith before its enactment. Id. at 203. The Court
further rejected any requirement for employers to demonstrate a business or eco
nomic purpose to justify involuntary retirement pursuant to such plans. Id. After the
Supreme Court's decision,- the 1978 amendments, including an amendment to §
4(f)(2), were enacted. The Conference Committee Report clearly indicated a Con
gressional intent to invalidate involuntary retirement pursuant to a plan within the
protected age group. H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [1978] 3
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 528-29. While resolving one issue concerning em
ployee benefit plans, Congress created a host of new legal issues for employee bene
fit plans by raising the protected age group to 70.
18. The 1978 amendments § 2(a); 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(f)(2) (West Cum. Supp.
1979) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1976)).

386

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:379

fuge to circumvent the Act; and (iv) the plan cannot excuse a re
fusal to hire or a forced retirement prior to age 70 because of age.
Section 4(f)(2) has been generally interpreted to permit
employers to offer different and lesser employee benefits to old
er workers. Concomitantly, it has been understood that a refusal to
hire someone in the protected age group violates the ADEA. Thus,
while it is illegal for an employer to refuse to hire an older worker,
it is legal to pay lesser benefits to that older worker once hired. As
a result of the 1978 amendments, involuntary retirement because
of age of any employee within the protected age group is illegal.
Section 4(f)(2) is, however, unclear as to whether a plan which
pays reduced benefits to older workers is a "subterfuge to evade
the purposes of the Act," if the benefit differential cannot be jus
tified by age related cost considerations. The Department of La
bor's consistent position has been that reduced benefits may be
paid to older workers if the cost of providing the benefit is at least
equal to the cost of providing benefits to younger employees. Spe
cifically, in 1969 the Department of Labor issued what has become
known as the equal cost or equal benefit interpretation of section
4(f)(2). It said:
A benefit plan will be considered in compliance with the statute
where the actual amount of payment made, or cost incurred, in
behalf of an older worker is equal to that made or incurred on
behalf of a younger worker, even though the older worker may
thereby receive a lesser amount of [pension or retirement] bene
fits or insurance coverage. 19

In other words, the Department of Labor has permitted an older
worker to be paid a lesser benefit than a similarly situated younger
worker only if the cost of providing the benefits to both workers is
equal. 20
There is no statutory basis for the proposition that a plan
which does not provide equal benefits or require equal employer
19. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a) (1977) (emphasis added).
20. The 1969 Interpretative Bulletin, while indicating that a plan meeting the
equal cost or equal benefit standard would be deemed to be nondiscriminating, did
not rule out the possibility that a plan not meeting the equal cost or equal benefit
test would satisfy § 4(£)(2). In effect, the 1969 Interpretative Bulletin appears to have
established the equal cost or equal benefit rule as a "safe harbor." Only after the
1978 amendments were enacted did the Department of Labor set forth the proposi
tion that, with the exception of retirement plans, equal cost or equal benefit is the
sole test for discrimination in employee benefit plans. 43 Fed. Reg. 43,265 (1978). In
fact, the legislative history of the 1978 amendments is not clear on the issue and cer
tainly does not justify this more restrictive interpretation. See note 22 infra.
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costs is a "subterfuge" which fails to satisfy section 4m(2). The leg
islative history of the 1967 Act21 and of the 1978 amendments 22 is
21. The lack of a clear legislative history occurred because Congress focused in
1967 on the hiring of older workers and in 1978 on the involuntary retirement of
older workers rather than amount of benefits to be provided under employee benefit
plans. There are, however, scattered references to employee benefit plan discrimina
tion in both the 1967 and 1978 legislative history.
Nowhere in the 1967 legislative history is the equal cost or equal benefit rule for
employee benefit plans articulated. The legislative history speaks in general terms of
reduced benefits. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967), re
printed in [1967] 2 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2213; S. REP. No. 723, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967).
While the 1967 legislative history indicates that a total cutoff of benefits to older
workers is permitted, the Department of Labor has interpreted § 4(f)(2) to permit
lesser benefits. Thus, the Department of Labor recently summarized the original
Congressional intent in 1967 as follows:
In fashioning the Section 4(f)(2) exception with respect to employee benefit
plans, Congress explicitly recognized that the cost of providing certain bene
'fits to older workers is greater than providing the same benefits to younger
workers. To require that the same benefits be provided to all workers with
out regard to age, Congress feared, would discourage the employment of
older workers or would unduly burden the employer and thereby jeopardize
the continued maintenance and operation of such plans.
43 Fed. Reg. 43,264 (1978).
While the difference between excluding an older worker and paying a lesser
benefit to older workers may seem to be a subtle shift in interpretation, it is critically
important. The Department of Labor and the EEOC now interpret benefit reductions
to be nondiscriminatory only when they are cost justified. Differences in costs of
benefits, however, are rarely so great as to justify a total cutoff of benefits (i.e., the
exclusion of an ,older worker). Since the 1967 legislative history authorized a total
cutoff in benefits, it seems doubtful that Congress interpreted § 4(f)(2) in 1967 as
requiring an equal cost or equal benefit justification.
22. In the legislative history of the 1978 amendments, there are a number of
references to an economic cost justification being required for welfare benefit plans.
Nowhere, however, is there a statement that equal costs or equal benefits is the sole
justification.
In fact, the legislative history supports the status quo. The Senate Report, for ex
ample, indicates that employee benefit plan practices which were lawful prior to the
1978 amendments were not to be disturbed: "Presently some employers reduce cov
erage for older workers under [welfare benefit] plans or increase the required em
ployee contribution as workers advance in age. This bill would not alter existing law
with respect to these practices." S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977).
Congressman Hawkins (D., Cal.) indicated during the floor debate that either an
economic purpose or a business purpose was sufficient. 124 CONGo REC. H2270
(daily ed. March 21, 1978).
Congressman Pepper (D., Fla.) cautioned that "a total cutoff of benefits" would
not be permitted "without full economic justification." Id. at H2275. Similarly
Congressman Weiss (D., N.Y.) said § 4(f)(2) required providing "reasonable benefits
to ... older employees." Id. at H2276.
The most explicit statement of the equal cost or equal benefit principle is con
tained in a colloquy between Senators Javits (R., N.Y.) and Williams (D., N.J.). Id.
at S4450-51 (daily ed. March 23, 1978).
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not clear about whether equal employer costs are the sole permis
sible justification for paying a lower benefit to an older employee.
Moreover, the requirement that the plan not be a subterfuge has
been the subject of surprisingly little litigation. In fact, one of the
few court decisions which considers the issue of whether a cost jus
tification is required as a condition of satisfying section 4(f)(2) is
McMann. 23 In McMann, the Supreme Court did not require a cost
justification. It held that to be a subterfuge an employer's intent to
violate the law must be demonstrated. 24 The Court defined a sub
terfuge to be "a scheme, plan, stratagem, or artifice of evasion. "25
As indicated previously, the McMann decision interpreted section
4(f)(2) to permit a forced retirement at age 60 under the terms of
an employee benefit plan. Specifically, the Court indicated that a
pension plan provision in effect prior to the enactment of the
ADEA which required retirement prior to age 65 could not be con
sidered to be a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the Act. 26 The
logic of the decision was that a pension plan provision written in
1941 could not possibly have been adopted by the employer in
order to circumvent the antidiscrimination requirements of the
ADEA. "To spell out an intent in 1941 to evade a statutory re
quirement not enacted until 1967 attributes, at the very least, a reThe Javits.Williams colloquy, in effect, quotes with approval the 1969 Depart
ment of Labor Interpretation which established the equal cost or equal benefit prin
ciple and states that the 1978 amendments were not intended to alter existing prac
tices. Id. Paradoxically, the Department of Labor quotes the Javits-Williams state
ment for support in the 1979 Interpretative Bulletin which dramatically altered its
interpretations of § 4(f)(2). 44 Fed. Reg. 30,649 (1979). The Department of Labor,
however, only acknowledged that the "old interpretation was less specific than the
new." Id. at 30,657.
The 1969 Department of Labor Interpretative Bulletin does not state that equal
cost or equal benefits is the sole justification for a discriminatory employee benefit
plan under § 4(f)(2). It is at least implicit in the 1969 interpretation that other justifi
cations were possible. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in McMann v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 434 U.S. at 192, explicitly recognized that noneconomic justifications
were possible. Given that: (1) there was no change in the relevant statutory language
(i.e., bona fide and subterfuge) in 1978, (2) the legislative history of the 1978 amend
ment is ambiguous at best, and (3) there is an express rejection of the cost justifica
tion as the exclusive rule in McMann, how much validity has the Department of La
bor's general interpretation, first articulated in September 1978, that the sole
justification for age based reductions in employee benefit plans is actuarially signifi
cant cost considerations?
23. 434 U.S. at 192.
24. Id. at 203.

25. [d.
Id.

26.
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markable prescience to the employer. "27 More importantly, the
Court also ruled that treating older employers less advantageously
than younger employees is not a per se violation of section 4(£)(2)
"requiring an employer to show an economic or business purpose
in order to justifY the subterfuge language of the Act. "28
While Congress did amend section 4(£)(2) to prohibit involun
tary retirement of employees within the protected age group, it did
not amend section 4(£)(2) with respect to the definition of a "sub
terfuge." Consequently, one can argue that the Court's statement
in McMann defining "subterfuge" as requiring an intent to evade
the purposes of the Act is still good law. It effectively rejected a
per se rule of equal employer costs. In summary, while the De
partment of Labor and the EEOC require a cost justification, the
Supreme Court in McMann did not. One can anticipate that some
employers will choose not to comply with the equal cost or equal
benefit interpretation which is the key to the federal enforcement
position. In so doing, employers will defiantly cite McMann as a
defense to their actions. 29
Another element of uncertainty concerning the reliability of
the Department of Labor's interpretations of the ADEA has been
introduced as the result of the transfer of jurisdiction for adminis
tration and enforcement of the ADEA from the Department of La
bor to the EEOC. This transfer was effective July 1, 1979, pur
suant to Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978. 30 The preamble to the
May 25, 1979, Interpretative Bulletin indicates that the EEOC
concurred with the Department of Labor's interpretations and
enforcement policies as expressed in the Bulletin. 31 In fact, the
EEOC staff participated with the Wage and Hour Division of the
Department of Labor in the development of the Interpretative Bul
letin. 32 After the publication of the Interpretative Bulletin and the
transfer of jurisdiction, the EEOC announced that while the De
27. [d.
28. [d.
29. There are no court decisions yet considering the effect of McMann on em
ployee benefits after the passage of the 1978 amendments. One significant issue is
whether the McMann language rejecting economic justification as a per se test for in
voluntary retirement is dicta and was not intended to be applied generally to em
ployee benefit issues.
30. See Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,807
(1978).
31. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,647, 30,657 (1979).
32. Leach's Speech, supra note 7.
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partment of Labor's interpretations may be relied on temporarily
by employers, the EEOC intends to publish its own guidelines. 33
This turnabout in the EEOC's policy raises the possibility that the
EEOC's enforcement position will differ from the interpretations
expressed in the Department of Labor's Interpretative Bulletin.
The EEOC is probably contemplating more stringent guidelines
relating to retirement plans. 34
In summary, the current state of the law interpreting the rea
soning of "subterfuge" in section 4(£)(2) is: The equal cost or equal
benefit rule which is the key interpretative principle for both the
Department of Labor and the EEOC is open to question. Further,
the Department of Labor and the EEOC do not always appear to
agree on its application. Given this unsettled state of the law, it is
questionable how much attention should be given the regulatory
interpretations.
The Interpretative Bulletins and the EEOC's guidelines repre
sent the enforcement position of the federal government. There is,
however, no statutory expression of the deference which should be
paid by employers to the Department of Labor's Interpretative
Bulletins or to EEOC's guidelines. The Supreme Court in Skid
more v. Swift & CO.35 stated:
[Such interpretations do provide informative guidance.] [W]hile
not controlling upon courts by reason of their authority, [they]
do constitute a body of experience and inform judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The
weight of such judgment in a particular case will depend upon
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control. 36

One should note, by way of comparison, instances in which
Congress has delegated to a regulatory body the power to promul
gate regulations, such legislative regulation is subject to less scru
tiny. Judicial review of legislative regulations is limited to insuring
consistency with underlying statutes, promulgation procedures and
the Constitution. 37 Additionally, consideration should be given to
33.
34.
35.
36.
Swift &
37.

44 Fed. Reg. 37,974 (1979).
See text accompanying notes 196-221 infra.
323 U.S. 134 (1944).
General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v.
Co., 323 U.S. at 140).
FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (1965).
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whether the interpretative regulation was made contemporaneously
with, or shortly following, the enactment of the statute38 and
whether the statement is one of long standing which has continued
in effect during a reenactment of the underlying statute. 39 As
noted above, the Department of Labor has consistently required an
equal benefit or an equal cost justification since 1969. Whether the
equal benefit or equal cost principle will be upheld under the
Skidmore standard is impossible to predict. One can anticipate,
however, that employers, at a minimum, will seek to litigate the
more objectionable and unsupported positions derived from the
equal benefit or equal cost analysis taken in the Interpretative Bul
letin and in EEOC's guidelines.
Employers who choose to rely in good faith on the Depart
ment of Labor's Interpretative Bulletin will be protected from lia
bility for violations of the ADEA in suits by the EEOC, and also
possibly in private lawsuits. 40 The EEOC has stated that until its
new rules are issued, employers will be protected if they comply
with the Interpretative Bulletin. 41 Thus, the Interpretative Bulletin
represents a "safe harbor," albeit a temporary safe harbor, in which
employers may choose to rely. Employers who follow such safe har
bor provisions may not be exposed to retroactive liability if a court
subsequently determines that the positions taken by the Depart
ment of Labor in the Interpretative Bulletin were incorrect.
One final cautionary note is in order. Since its enactment in
1967, the ADEA has permitted states to pass their own age dis
crimination laws,42 which most states have done. 43 In many in
stances, their provisions differ significantly from the federal law.
38. See Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 749-50 (1969). See also K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 503, at 126 (3d ed., 1972).
39. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267,274-75 (1974).
40. The Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, § 10,29 U.S.C. § 259 (1976), applies to ac
tions under the ADEA. ADEA § 7(e)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(e)(1) (West Cum. Supp.
1979). McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217, 219-20 n.3 (4th Cir., 1976),
rev'd on other grounds, 434 U.S. 192 (1977); 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1976). See accord
City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 720 n.37
(1978) (denying retroactive monetary relief in a title VII sex discrimination suit
where employer relied upon "somewhat confusing" Labor Department administra
tive interpretations).
41. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,974-75 (1979).
42. Simpson v. Alaska, 423 F. Supp. 552 (D. Alaska 1976), aff'd, 608 F.2d 1171
(9th Cir. 1979). ADEA § 14(a), 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1976). See also 124 CONGo REC.
H9972-73 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1977) (House rejected amendment to ADEA to
preempt state law), S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1977).
43. See Appendix A (listing of state age discrimination laws and key provi
sions).
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For example, while the ADEA does not protect individuals less
than 40 years old, some state laws have no lower age limit. 44 Like
wise, while the ADEA does not apply to any employer having
fewer than 20 employees, some state laws do not require a mini
mum number of employees. 45 Coinciding with the enactment of
the 1978 amendments, several states have amended their state
antidiscrimination laws to expand protection of their employees to
age 70. 46 Some states even have removed the maximum protected
age limit altogether. 47 Certain state laws, however, do not contain
an exemption equivalent to the bona fide plan exemption found in
section 4(£)(2) of ADEA.48 Consequently, employers will have to
examine carefully state antidiscrimination laws to determine
whether their employee benefit plans satisfy state law require
ments which may be more stringent than federal law require
ments. 49
To complicate compliance further, the ability of states to pass
more stringent antidiscrimination laws is limited indirectly by
ERISA. ERISA does not preempt any federal law but does super
sede all state laws which pertain to an employee benefit plan. 50
The failure of state laws to include a bona fide plan exception may
cause the state antidiscrimination law to conflict with ERISA. Al
though a state law may be enacted as an antidiscrimination law, it
may, in fact, be a prohibited state law regulating employee benefit
plans. 51
44. ld.
45. ld.
46. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-126 (West Pamph. 1979) (amending id. at §
31-126 (West 1949)): FLA. STAT. ANN. § 13.261 (West Pamph. 1979); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 363.02 (West Pamph. 1980) (amending id. at § 363.02 (West 1955)); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4101.17 (Page Pamph. 1979) (amending id. at § 4101.17 (Page
1961)); R.l. GEN. LAWS § 28-6-1 (Pamph. 1980) (amending id. at § 28-6-1 (1962)).
47. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420.1 (West Pamph. 1979) (amending id. at § 1420
(West 1959)); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8 (Supp. 1979) (amending id. at §
354-A:8 (1965)).
48. Some states had age discrimination laws with no upper age limit prior to
the 1978 amendment. See Appendix.
49. See, e.g., Simpson v. Alaska, 423 F. Supp. 552 (D. Alaska 1976), afI'd, 608
F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1979).
SO. ERISA § 514(a),(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a),(b) (1976).
51. There was some concern expressed prior to the adoption of the 1978
amendments that state age discrimination laws not interfere with ERISA's regulation
of all matters "rel;ting" to employee benefit plans. 124 CONGo REC. S4,451 (daily ed.
Mar. 23, 1978); id. S4,767 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1978).
The Depar~ent of Labor Interpretative Bulletin on § 4(£)(2) contains a caution
ary note that the failure of ADEA to preempt state age discrimination laws does not
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In summary, employee benefit plans should be reviewed in
light of the 1978 amendments, the legislative history and the Inter
pretative Bulletin. The Interpretative Bulletin, however, is not
controlling upon courts. It is a safe harbor for employers. While
employers may choose to ignore some of the more unsupported po
sitions in the Interpretative Bulletin, they may be forced to litigate
the issues involved. In addition to federal law, employee benefit
plans should be reviewed in light of applicable state age discrimi
nation laws. Employers must decide whether to ignore state laws
to the extent such laws are preempted by ERISA. The review and
decision making process will require careful judgment of specific
benefits. Section III of this article will assist the reader in judging
how these benefits can be provided.
III.

EEOC's
4(f)(2)

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S AND

INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION

THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES

As previously indicated, section 4(f)(2) of the ADEA provides
that it is not an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
observe the terms of any bona fide employment benefit plan, such
as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subter
fuge to evade the purposes of the Act. In absence of this section
4(f)(2) exception, a reduction in employee benefits by an employer
on the basis of age violates the ADEA because it clearly discrimi
nates against an individual with respect to his or her terms, condi
tions or privileges of employment. The Interpretative Bulletin sets
forth the equal cost or equal benefit position of the Department of
Labor and describes in great detail the extent to which section
4(f)(2) authorizes certain reductions in employee benefits on the
basis of age. 52
affect the ERISA preemption of any state law which is related to an employee bene
fit plan. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(g) (1979). The preamble to the Interpretative Bulletin
quotes the colloquy between Senators Javits and Williams. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,657
(1979).
While no courts have decided whether ERISA preempts state age discrimination
laws, several cases have considered ERISA's relationship to other employment dis
crimination laws. See Pervel Indus. Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights, 468 F.
Supp. 490 (D. Ct. 1978), aff'd, 603 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1979) (ERISA preempts state
sex discrimination law on pregnancy). Contra, Bucyrus-Eire Co. v. Department of In
dus., Labor & Human Relations, 599 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1979); Goodyear Tire & Rub
ber Co. v. Department of Industry, 273 N.W.2d 786, 793-97 (Wis. App. 1978); Brown
Co. v. Department of Industry, 476 F. Supp. 209 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
52. The Department of Labor's Interpretative Bulletin on § 4(f)(2) appeared in
final form on May 25, 1970 and is the key interpretation of permissible discrimina
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According to the Interpretative Bulletin, benefits provided to
older workers may be less than those provided to younger workers
only if every element required by section 4(f)(2) is "clearly and un
mistakably met. "53 The three key elements of section 4(f)(2) are:
(1) The plan is a "bona fide employee benefit plan"; (2) the lower
benefits are provided in "observ[ance of] terms of" such
plan; and (3) the plan or plan provisions are not a "subterfuge to
evade the purposes of the Act. "54

All three elements must be satisfied in order for the employee
benefit plan to be considered in compliance with the ADEA in an
employee benefit plan in which an older worker receives a lesser
amount of benefits or insurance coverage. The Interpretative Bulle
tin notes that the three elements are to be construed narrowly.
The burden is on the employer to demonstrate compliance.
A.

Bona Fide Employee Benefit Plan

The Interpretative Bulletin defines an "employee benefit plan"
as a plan which provides employees with fringe benefits. 55 For ex
ample, a retirement, pension or insurance plan would be so catego
rized. The section 4(f)(2) exception is inapplicable to wages or
salaries. 56 The Interpretative Bulletin discusses the application of
section 4(f)(2) to a number of specific types of employee benefit
plans. The description of plans discussed in the Interpretative
Bulletin and affected by the ADEA is apparently for illustrative
purposes only. The Interpretative Bulletin discusses only pension,
tion under ADEA for employee benefit plans. 29 C.F.R. § 860, (1979) (hereinafter
referred to as the Interpretative Bulletin or the final Interpretative Bulletin). The In
terpretative Bulletin was published in proposed form on September 22, 1978. 43
Fed. Reg. 43,264 (1978). The EEOC has issued a proposed interpretation which by
its terms adopts the Department of Labor's Interpretative Bulletin without modifica
tion. 44 Fed. Reg. 68,858, 68,862 (1979). The author understands, however, that the
EEOC intended only to renumber the Interpretative Bulletin, but not to adopt it. In
stead, as indicated in EEOC Vice Chairman Leach's speech, the EEOC is consider
ing substantial changes in the interpretation of § 4(f)(2) with respect to retirement
plans. Leach's Speech, supra note 7; Telephone conversation between author and
John Pagano, EEOC, Office of General Counsel, Legal Counsel Division (Dec. 21,
1979).
53. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a)(I) (1979).
54. ld.
55. ld. at § 860.120(b).
56. Compare the broad prohibition against discrimination in "compensation"
with the narrower exception for "bona fide employee benefit plan, such as a retire
ment, pension, or insurance plan. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(I) (1976); 29 U.S.C.A. §
623(f)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
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group life and health insurance and group long-term disability in
surance plans. Other plans, such as insured sick leave plans, life
insurance and disability plans funded by individual insurance
products also constitute employee benefit plans which are subject
to the ADEA.57 All employer provided fringe benefits fall within
this definition. More surprising is that "employee pay-all" benefits
are subject to the ADEA.58
An employee benefit will be considered bona fide only if two
prerequisites are met. First, its terms must be accurately described
in writing to all employees. Second, it must actually prOVide bene
fits in accordance with the terms of the plan. 59 In addition, em
ployers are obliged to notify employees of any changes in the
plan. 60 Satisfying the participant disclosure requirements of ERISA
and its regulations are deemed to be sufficient for ADEA pur
poses. 61
The written disclosure requirement of ADEA will create prob
lems for plans which are exempted from ERISA disclosure require
ments. 62 Requiring written disclosure for ADEA purposes for plans
which have already been granted statutory or regulatory exemp
57. While all fringe benefit plans or programs are considered employee benefit
plans for ADEA purposes, the only class of plan which can discriminate against older
workers without the Department of Labor considering the plan to be a "subterfuge"
is a plan in which age is an actuarially significant cost factor. The "subterfuge" re
quirement is considered at length. See text accompanying notes 71-120 infra.
58. Id. See also 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648 (1979) (preamble to Interpretative Bulletin).
The rules for employee pay all plans are considered at length. See text accompa
nying notes 102-120 infra.
59. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(b) (1979). The 1969 Interpretative Bulletin had no writ
ten disclosure requirements. [d. at § 860.120 (1969).
60. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(b) (1979).
61. Most importantly, ERISA requires each participant to receive a summary
description "written in a manner to be understood by the average participant."
ERISA § 102(a)(I), 29 U.S.C. § 1022 (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-2 (1979).
62. Certain employee benefit plans are exempted from the disclosure require
ments of ERISA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1030 (1976), by statute or Department of Labor
regulation. Congress exempted plans sponsored by government or church organiza
tion and certain nonqualified deferred compensation plans. ERISA § 4(b)(I), (2),
(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(I), (3), (5) (1976). In addition, the Department of Labor has
exempted certain employee pay all plans, bonus plans, supplemental retirement bene
fit plans, tax sheltered annuities and individual retirement annuity programs from,
among others, ERISA disclosure requirements. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2510.3-1, -2, -3 (1979).
One irony is that the Department of Labor, Pension-Welfare Benefits Administrator,
exempted certain fringe benefit plans from ERISA disclosure requirements although
there is specific statutory authority to require them, while the Department of Labor,
Wage and Hour Division, imposed disclosure requirements to all employee benefit
plans, without exception, although there is no explicit statutory authority to impose
such requirements. [d.
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tions from disclosure under ERISA is inconsistent policymaking.
Furthennore, the requirement of a written plan and notice to em
ployees goes beyond judicial interpretations of the bona fide re
quirement. 63 For example, the Supreme Court in McMann ap
peared to require only that the plan exist and pay benefits in order
to satisfY the bona fide requirement. 64
B.

"To Observe the Terms" of a Plan

The Interpretative Bulletin makes clear that the section 4(f)(2)
exemption protects actions which might otherwise be discrimina
tory only if the action is taken in accordance with the express
tenus of the plan. 65 Unwritten procedures which provide a reduc
tion in benefits for older workers are not protected by section
4(f)(2).66 For example, an oral promise by the employer to pay
benefits will not satisfY this requirement although the employer, in
fact, pays the benefits promised. In addition, the Interpretative
Bulletin requires that the discriminatory provision must not be an
optional term subject to employer discretion. 67 Thus, many in
fonnal employee benefit plans will have to be reduced to writing in
order to continue providing reduced benefits to older workers.
Some courts have rejected the notion that the discriminatory
policy must be a written mandatory tenn of a plan. 68 The basis for
the Department of Labor's position is that employees must have
some opportunity to know of a discriminatory policy and to plan, or
protest, accordingly.69 In addition, the mandatory application of
the plan provision assures that the discriminatory provision will be
equally applied to all employees of the same age. 70
63. Courts have generaily interpreted bona fide as meaning only that the plan
must actually pay benefits as promised. See, e.g., Marshall v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 575
F.2d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 1978); Marshall v. Atlantic Container Line, 470 F. Supp. 71,
72 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Aldendifer v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 18 Empl. Prac. Dec.
~ 8874, at 5616 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
64. 434 U.S. at 194.
65. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(c) (1979).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Marshall v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 575 F.2d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 1978);
Marshall v. Atlantic Containter Line, 470 F. Supp. 71, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Contra,
Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Company, 500 F.2d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 1974) (Tuttle, J.,
dissenting); Marshall v. American Motors Corp., 20 Fair Empl. Proc. Cas. 575, 579
(E.D. Mich. 1979).
69. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(c) (1979).
70. [d.
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"Not a Subterfuge"

In order to provide older workers lesser benefits under a bona
fide employee benefit plan pursuant to section 4(£)(2), the plan
must not be a subterfuge to evade the purpopes of the Act. The
Department of Labor and the EEOC take the position that an em
ployee benefit plan, other than a retirement plan, which prescribes
lower benefits for older workers is not a subterfuge if such low
er benefits are justified by actuarially "significant cost considera
tions. "71 Actuarially "significant cost considerations" simply means
that an employer providing unequal benefits must be prepared to
show that the actual costs for benefits of younger and older em
ployees are equal. A plan which provides lower benefits for older
workers is not a subterfuge when the actual amount of payment
made, or the cost incurred on behalf of an older worker, is equal to
the actual amount of payment or cost incurred on behalf of a
younger worker, even if the older worker receives a lesser amount
of benefits or insurance coverage. 72 Age must be a significant cost
factor.73 Consequently, the preamble to the Interpretative Bulletin
concludes that an uninsured paid sick leave plan, like a paid
vacation plan, does not fall within section 4(£)(2) because age is not
an actuarially significant cost factor in such a plan. The preamble
takes the position, however, that an insured paid sick leave plan,
unlike a short term disability plan, may fall within section 4(£)(2).
This would happen when the employer can prove that the expendi
ture for the older workers' benefits is more costly.74 Although age
71. 29 C.F.R. § 860. 120(a)(I), (d) (1979). While the EEOC has not yet publishkd
its interpretation of § 4(f)(2), it is clear that the EEOC subscribes to the general prin
ciple of permitting lower benefits for older workers only where justified by
"actuarially significant cost considerations."
.
The general rule applied by the Labor Department is that age-based reduc
tions in employee benefit plans must be justified by actuarially significant
cost considerations. I have belabored the point but it should be kept firmly
in mind. It is the test for compliance with the 4(f)(2) exception and will not
be changed. I am reasonably certain of that. Indeed, the Commission is re
viewing changes only that, fairly stated, would constitute deviations from
that principle-exceptions which result in employee benefit cutoffs or re
ductions which are not justified by actuarially significant cost considerations.
Leach's Speech, supra note 7.
72. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a)(l) (1979).
73. [d.
74. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,649-50 (1979). The preamble comments confuse
two separate issues. The first is whether age is an actuarially significant cost factor in
an uninsured paid sick leave plan. The second is whether an uninsured paid sick
leave plan is an employee benefit plan described in § 4(f)(2). As indicated in the text
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should be a significant cost factor, the distinction between an in
sured and an uninsured plan is nonsensical. Benefits from a sick
leave pl~m can be funded either by insurance contracts, through
trusts or directly out of the general assets of the employer. What
ever the funding vehicle, however, the cost of maintaining such a
plan does increase with the age of the employee participant. Older
workers tend to experience longer and more serious sicknesses
than younger workers. This is true whatever the funding method.
An uninsured sick leave plan should be within the section 4(£)(2)
exception to the same extent as an insured sick leave plan.
The Interpretative Bulletin's general introduction is unclear
about how precise the equivalency in cost for an older worker and
a younger worker must be. At one point, the Interpretative Bulle
tin states that benefit levels for older workers may be reduced to
the extent necessary to achieve approximate equivalency in cost for
older and younger workers.75 In the next sentence, however, the
Department of Labor states that an employee benefit plan will
comply with the statute when the actual amount of payment made,
or the cost incurred, on behalf of an older worker is equal to that
made on behalf of a younger worker. 76 There is a distinct differ
ence between approximate equivalency in cost and precise equiva
lency in cost.
The Interpretative Bulletin in its discussion of cost data, how
ever, makes clear that the equivalency need only be approximate.
Specifically, the Department of Labor requires that cost data must
be valid and reasonable in order to justify a reduction benefit for
older workers.77 This standard is met if the employer has cost data
which shows its actual cost for providing a particular benefit over a
"representative period of years. "78 In addition, an employer may
rely on cost data for a "larger group of similarly situated employ
ees. "79 If reliable cost data is not available, an employer may rely
above the Department of Labor incorrectly concludes that age is not a significant
cost factor. The preamble comment also concludes that an uninsured paid sick leave
plan is not an employee benefit plan described in § 4(f)(2). This conclusion is at
odds with the Interpretative Bulletin itself which defines employee benefit plan as
an employer provided program which provides "fringe benefits." 29 C.F.R.
§ 860.120(b) (1979). This broad definition should encompass a broad range of plans,
including uninsured sick leave plans.
75. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a)(l) (1979).
76. Id.
77. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(I) (1979).
78. Id.
79. Id. The proposed Interpretative Bulletin had a more rigid rule requiring an
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on reasonable projections made from existing data. If an employer,
either noninsured or experience rated by an insurance company,
incurs costs which significantly differ from costs for a group of simi
larly situated employees, the employer may not rely on cost data
for the similarly situated employees when such reliance will result
in significantly lower benefits for older workers.80 Precisely what is
meant by "valid and reasonable," "representative period of years,"
"larger group of similarly situated employees" and "significantly
differ" is unclear. What is clear, however, is that the Department
of Labor decided to permit an employer to make adjustments in
benefits on the basis of any reasonable data on benefit costS. 81
As a practical matter, most employers probably will look to in
surers to determine whether cost data will justify benefit reduc
tions for older workers under insured plans. The compliance obli
gation, however, is the employer's not the insurer's.82 Further
more, it is not at all clear under existing case law whether an
employer is legally entitled to rely on the insurance carrier.83 Em
ployers, consequently, may wish to seek letters of representation
from their insurers that the insurance contracts being issued to
them satisfy the cost requirements of the Interpretative Bulletin.

1. Determination of Cost Incurred
Two methods are permitted under the Interpretative Bulletin
to justify cost differences in employee benefit plans. The first
method, the "benefit by benefit basis," requires cost reduction to
be separately justified for each individual benefit. 84 In the benefit
employer to sue its own cost data except when such data did not exist or was statis
tically unreliable, in which case any reasonable actuarial data or benefit cost for sim
ilarly situated employees could be used. 43 Fed. Reg. 43,269 (1978); id. at 43, 265
(preamble to the Proposed Interpretative Bulletin).
80. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(I) (1979).
81. See 44 Fed. Reg. 30,650 (1979) (preamble to the Final Interpretative Bulle
tin).
82. ADEA § 4 prohibits age discrimination by employers, employment agencies
and unions, but not by insurance companies. ADEA § 4, 29 V.S.C. § 623 (1976), as
amended by 29 V.S.C.A. § 623 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). But see Spirt v. TIAA
CREF, 475 F. Supp. 1298 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), stating that an insurance company is an
employer in a title VII sex discrimination case where the terms of the pension plan
were in the insurance company's control in a functional sense. [d. at 1308.
83. An employer may be held liable for sex discrimination under title VII in a
pension plan where insurer used sex based actuarial tables to determine plan bene
fits. EEOC v. Colby College, 598 F.2d 1139 (1st Cir. 1978); Sobel v. Yeshiva Vniv.,
477 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Peters v. Wayne State Vniv., 476 F. Supp. 1343
(E.D. Mich. 1979); Spirt v. TIAA-CREFF, 475 F. Supp. 1298 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
84. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(2)(i) (1979).
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by benefit approach, adjustments must be made in the amount or
level of a specific form of benefit for a specific event or contin
gency. For example, higher long-term disability costs for older em
ployees may justify a reduction in the amount of disability benefits
for older workers on the basis of age, but not a reduction in any
other benefit, such as a retirement benefit. The benefit by benefit
approach does not justify the substitution of one form of benefit for
another. This is so even though both forms of benefit are designed
for the same contingency, such as death or income replacement.
For example, if an older worker becomes disabled, he or she might
be entitled to both retirement benefits and long-term disability
benefits in order to provide for income replacement. Under the
benefit by benefit approach, an employer would not be justified in
redUcing a retirement benefit because of the increased cost of pro
viding a disability benefit.
The Departmjent of Labor never clearly defines "benefit. "85 It
does, however, reject the broad notion of benefit as being all pay
ments made upon the occurrence of a certain event such as retire
ment, death or disability. This is known as an event by event
test. 86 It also appears to reject the more narrowly defined approach
defining a benefit in terms of the employee benefit plan producing
the benefit. This is known as a plan by plan test. 87 The Interpreta
tive Bulletin fails to discuss whether all benefits provided under an
individual insurance contract constitute a single benefit. The Inter
pretative Bulletin also fails to discuss the treatment of ancillary
benefits. As a result, for those benefits which do not fit neatly into
a particular category, questions remain as to how they should be
treated. 88
The second method, the "benefit package approach," permits
cost comparisons to be made in the aggregate for bona fide em
85. A benefit is vaguely defined in the Interpretative Bulletin as payments
made in a specific form upon the occurrence of a specific event or contingency. Id.
In the preamble, the Department of Labor itself acknowledges the "flexibility" in
the definition. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,651 (1979).
86. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,651 (1979).
87. Id.
88. For example, how is waiver of premium on account of disability under a
life insurance contract to be treated? Is it a life insurance or a disability benefit?
How is the accrual of benefits for disability under a pension plan to be treated? Is it
a retirement or a disability benefit? How is an accidental· death and dismemberment
benefit under a life insurance contract to be treated? Is it an accidental death/
disability benefit or a death benefit? How is a survivorship benefit under a retire
ment plan to be treated? Is it a death or a retirement benefit?
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ployee benefit plans. 89 The benefit package approach requires an
employer to maintain an aggregate benefit cost level, but permits
the employer to reduce or even eliminate some benefits while main
taining other benefits at higher levels. In theory, the employer's
entire fringe benefit package can be justified in the aggregate. Cost
justification of individual benefits is unnecessary. The benefit pack
age approach is, however, available only if the overall result is no
lesser cost to the employer for the benefits of older workers, and
the benefits to employees are not less favorable. 90
The following example from the Interpretative Bulletin illus
trates the application of the benefit package approach. 91 Assume an
employer has two employee benefit plans, A and B. Age related
cost data would justifY a 10% reduction in benefits for older work
ers under each plan if a benefit by benefit apprlJach was used. Un
der the benefit package approach, the employer may reduce the
benefits under plan B br, 20% i~ the benefits under plan A are
unreduced. If the benefits under plan A cost only one-half as much
as the benefits under plan B, however, the benefits under plan B
may be reduced by only 15% (10% plus 5%) because a greater re
duction would reduce total benefit cost to the employer. The ex
ample clearly illustrates that the cost of each benefit reduction still
must be analyzed under the benefit package approach.
What then, is the advantage of the benefit package approach?
The benefit package approach, in theory, offers more flexibility to
employers in benefit plan design. 92 An excessive reduction in one
benefit can be justified by a modest reduction in another benefit.
The Interpretative Bulletin, however, places so many limitations
on the benefit package approach that it is unworkable for all but
the largest employers. The benefit package approach is of limited
value for several reasons.
89. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(2)(iii) (1979). See preamble to Interpretative Bulle
tin, 44 Fed. Reg. 30,650 (1979). The proposed Interpretative Bulletin forbade the use
of a benefit package analysis. 43 Fed. Reg. 43,266 (1978). The proposal rejected the
benefit package approach because an employee might receive a drastic benefit re
duction in a benefit of particular value to him. Id. Also, the Department seemed con
cerned about the complex actuarial analyses which are required under a benefit
package analysis. ld.
90. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(2) (1979).
91. ld. at (f)(2)(v).
92. Many employers criticized the proposed Interpretative Bulletin's failure to
permit the use of the benefit package approach claiming that a strict benefit analysis
deprives employers and employees of the opportunity to design a fringe benefit
package responsive to their needs. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,651 (1979).
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First, only plans covered under section 4(£)(2) may be consid
ered. Therefore, the entire compensation package, including salary
and non-age related fringe benefits, such as paid vacation plans,
group, legal insurance or uninsured sick leave plans, may not be
reflected in the computation. For example, an employer cannot jus
tify decreases in long-term disability benefits on the basis of an in
crease in salary. 93
Second, a retirement or pension plan may not be considered
under the benefit package approach because such plans are not
subject to the general rule requiring equal costs or equal bene
fits.94 The exclusion of retirement plan benefits from use under the
benefit package approach is particularly unfortunate since many
pension plans provide ancillary disability and death benefits which
could otherwise be taken into account. For example, a pension
plan ,providing a death benefit after normal retirement date in ex
cess of the cost of providing a death benefit for a younger worker
cannot be used under the Interpretative Bulletin to justifY a reduc
tion in group term life insurance for the older employee. 95 This re
striction makes good plan design more difficult. Employers try to
coordinate various benefits in order to take into account the needs
of their employees at different ages. Employers try to avoid unnec
essary duplication of benefits by coordinating different benefits
from different plans which are designed to serve the same purpose.
In our example, both the survivor income benefit under the pen
sion plan and the group term life insurance benefit provide bene
fits to the employee's immediate family upon his or her death. Un
der the Department of Labor interpretation, however, these two
benefits may not be interrelated.
Third, the benefit package approach cannot justify reduction in
health benefits for older workers in excess of the reduction which
would be justified under the benefit by benefit approach. 96 The In
93. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(2)(i) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,656 (1979) (preamble to
the Interpretative Bulletin).
94. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(2)(ii) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,656 (1979) (preamble to
Interpretative Bulletin). For a detailed discussion of the rules governing retirement
plans see text accompanying notes 188-292 infra.
95. The EEOC apparently is considering revising this rule to permit pre
retirement death benefits under a pension, but not a profit-sharing plan to be used to
justify reductions in other death benefits provided under a welfare benefit plan.
UPDATE, newsletter of Towers, Perrin, Foster and Crosby, Boston, Mass. (July 25,
1979).
96. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(2)(iii) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,656 (1979) (preamble
to the Interpretative Bulletin).
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terpretative Bulletin justifies this restriction based on legislative
history which emphasizes the fundamental importance of health in
surance benefits to older workers. 97
Fourth, reductions in benefits greater than that justified under
the benefit by benefit approach must be offset by making another
benefit available to the employees affected. 98 This restriction pre
vents employers from trading away a benefit available to all em
ployees for increased benefits available to relatively few employ
ees. 99
Fifth, employers who use the benefit package approach must
be prepared to produce data to show that reductions are fully
justified. 10o Employers will need to retain an actuary to prepare
the cost analysis. Some employers will not be willing, or may not
be able, to incur this additional cost.
Small employers are least likely to use the benefit package ap
proach. Normally, they will look to insurance companies to present
a benefit plan to them. Insurance companies, in tum, will probably
develop contracts which comply with the Interpretative Bulletin
using the benefit by benefit analysis. The benefit package approach
does not represent a practical marketing alternative for an insur
ance company because it requires a thorough analysis of all em
ployee benefit plans sponsored by the employer, some of which
may not be provided by the insurance company involved. Since
insurance companies will market products on the basis that
each product is designed to comply with the benefit by benefit ap
proach, employers purchasing those products, in tum, will be obli
gated to justify their plans on a benefit by benefit basis.
2. Age Ranges Used to Calculate Benefit Reductions
The Interpretative Bulletin authorizes benefit cost comparisons
in benefit reductions to be made on the basis of age brackets of up
to five years. 101 Under an age bracket analysis, the average cost of
97. 29 C.F.R. § 860. 120(f)(2)(iii) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,656 (1979) (preamble
to the Interpretative Bulletin).
98. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(2)(iv) (1979); 44 Fed Reg. 30,661 (1979) (preamble to
the Interpretative Bulletin).
99. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,657 (1979) (preamble to Interpretative Bulletin).
100. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(2)(v) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,657 (1979) (preamble
to the Interpretative Bulletin).
101. The proposed Interpretative Bulletin permitted costs to be calculated only
on a year by year basis. 43 Fed. Reg. 43,266, 43,269 (1978). The proposal would have
prohibited the five year age bracket analysis customarily used to calculate, group life
insurance costs. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,652 (1979) (preamble to the Interpretative Bulletin).
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a benefit for all employees within an age range must be equal to or
greater than the average cost of a benefit for all employees in the
immediately preceding age bracket of equal duration. For example,
benefits for employees 60 to 65 years of age may be reduced only
to the extent necessary to achieve cost equivalency with employees
55 to 60 years old. Benefits for employees 65 to 70, however, may
not be reduced to the extent necessary to achieve equivalency in
cost with benefits for all employees within an age range of more
than five years, for example, 18 to 64 years old. While the age
range analysis is primarily used to determine benefit costs for
group term life insurance, under the Interpretative Bulletin, age
ranges may be used to analyze costs and benefit reductions for any
employee benefit.
3. Employee Contributions
Many employee benefit plans require employees to pay some
or all of the costs of providing benefits under a plan sponsored by
the employer. In the Interpretative Bulletins, these plans are di
vided into two classes. 102 The first class comprises those plans in
which employees are required to contribute some or all of the cost
of providing benefits under the plan as a condition of employment.
Section 4(a)(I) of the ADEA prohibits discrimination in "terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment" in addition to prohibiting
discrimination in compensation. 103 The Interpretative Bulletin
takes the position that an older employee cannot be required as a
condition of employment to make greater contributions in order to
receive the same level of benefits as a younger employee. 104 The
preamble to the Interpretative Bulletin justifies the Department of
Labor's position by pointing out that if participation in the em
ployee benefit is involuntary, requiring an older employee to make
greater contributions does discriminate in compensation on the ba
sis of age. The employee has no option but to receive less take
home pay than a similarly situated younger worker. 105
The second class includes those contributory plans in which
participation by employees is voluntary. lOS The Interpretative Bul
102. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(4)(i), (ii) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,659 (1979).
103. ADEA § 4(a)(I); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(I) (1976).
104. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(4)(i) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,659 (1979).
105. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,652 (1979); cf. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978) (requiring female employees to contrib
ute more than male employees to a retirement plan violates title VII because the fe
male's take home pay would be less than a similarly situated male employee).
106. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(4)(ii) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,659 (1979).

1980]

AGE DISCRIMINATION

405

letin takes the position that benefit plans sponsored by employers
which require employee contributions as a condition of participa
tion and receipt of benefits are subject to the ADEA. If participa
tion is voluntary, a plan will not be lawful when the cost of partici
pation to older workers is discriminatory on the basis of age. l07 The
Interpretative Bulletin further divides voluntary employee con
tribution plans into three categories, applying separate rules to
each category. The first category is the voluntary employee pay-all
plans. lOS Older workers, like younger workers, may be required to
contribute the full amount of increased cost for their age as a con
dition of participation. At the same time, the Interpretative Bulle
tin prohibits an employer from excluding older employees from
participation in such plans or requiring older employees to contrib
ute more than the amount of the cost increase justified by in
creased age. The Department of Labor ,never clearly states why
voluntary employee pay-all plans are subject to the ADEA. Since
participation is voluntary, older workers are free\ to avoid reduc
tions in take home pay by declining to participate in the plan. Con
sequently, there is no discrimination in compensation. Since an
employee can decline to participate in a plan, the plan certainly is
not a term or condition of employment. Apparently, the Depart
ment considers the right of an older employee to participate in a
voluntary employee pay-all plan on an equal basis with a younger
employee to be a privilege of employment. 109
The second category of voluntary plans is a noncontributory or
employer pay-all plan. llo Where no employee participant is re
quired to make any contribution to a plan, there is obviously no
age based discrimination against older workers. The Interpretative
Bulletin provides, however, that when participation is voluntary
and the employer pays all costs for younger workers, the employer
cannot require older workers to contribute towards any age related
cost increase. 111 The Department of Labor's position is contra
107. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,652-53 (1979) (preamble to Interpretative Bulletin).
108. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(4)(ii)(A) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,653 (1979) (pream
ble to Interpretative Bulletin).
109. ADEA § 4(a)(I), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(l) (1976), prohibits employer discrimi
nation in "compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of
an individual's age." Id. The Department of Labor has taken an inconsistent positiori
on voluntary employee pay all plans by exempting them from the requirements of
Title I of ERISA. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 2510.3-1,-2,-3 (1979).
110. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(4)(ii)(B) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,653 (1979) (pream
ble to Interpretative Bulletin).
111. Id.
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dicted by the legislative history of the 1978 amendments which
pennits any additional costs to fund benefits for older workers to
be borne by the older workers. 112
The third category of voluntary employee contributory plans
includes contributory plans in which the employer and the em
ployees share in the plan costs. 113 The Interpretative Bulletin takes
the position that when participation in the benefit program is vol
untary and the employee bears part of the cost for providing the
benefit, the employer cari require an older employee to bear a pro
portionate share of the increased cost as a condition of participation
in the plan.114
In so doing, the Interpretative Bulletin gives employers two
alternatives. The employer and the older worker can be required
to share in the increased cost of providing the same benefit to
older workers as is provided to younger workers. This would be
appropriate so long as employee contributions are a fixed per
centage of the total cost of their benefit. In the alternative, the
employer may make the same dollar contributions for both older
and younger workers causing a reduced benefit to be paid to the
older worker. The Interpretative Bulletin notes that the older em
ployee may be given the option to make additional contributions
necessary to receive the same level of benefits as the younger em
ployee. 115

112. "Presently some employers reduce coverage for older workers under [wel
fare benefit] plans or increase the required employee contribution as workers ad
vance in age. This bill would not alter existing law with respect to these practices."
S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977).
113. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(4)(ii)(C) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,653 (1979) (pream
ble to Interpretative Bulletin).
114. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(4)(ii)(C) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,653 (1979) (pream
ble to Interpretative Bulletin). The preamble to the Interpretative Bulletin gives the
following example: Assume that the cost of a contributory group insurance plan in
creases in total monthly premium from $20 to $30 per month for each covered em
ployee as the employee moves from a lower to a higher five year age bracket range.
Further assume that employer and the employee each contribute 50% of the monthly
premium. The employer can increase the employee's monthly contribution from $10
to $15. The employer's contribution, however, could not be less than $15 per month
(such as $10) because this would require the older employee to match employer con
tributions more than dollar for dollar, something that younger employees are not re
quired to do. In the alternative, the employer may choose to reduce the level of ben
efits so that the total premium remained at $20, of which the older employee paid
$10. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,653 (1979) (preamble to Interpretative Bulletin).
U5. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(4)(iii) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,653 (1979) (preamble
to Interpretative Bulletin).
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4. Coordination with Government Sponsored Benefits
Many employee benefit plans reduce benefits by considering
government provided benefits such as social security or Medicare
benefits. This approach is called "integration." Integration permits
an employer to fix the total amount of benefit from all sources
which an employee will receive. Concomitantly, it reduces em
ployer costs.
The Interpretative Bulletin permits government sponsored
benefits, such as Medicare and social security, to be integrated
with employer provided plan benefits so long as older employees
enjoy no lesser total benefit than younger employees. 116 Integra
tion with government sponsored benefits is permitted although the
availability of such benefits may be based on age and the applica
tion of integration may make employer costs for older employees
less than for younger employees. For example, Medicare benefits
are only available to employees age 65 or 0Ider.117 Health care
benefits may be offset by Medicare benefits. Once Medicare bene
fits are considered for older workers, the cost of providing health
care benefits for younger workers may actually be less than the
cost of providing health care benefits for older workers. us
5. Discrimination Against Retirees
One issue not discussed in the Interpretative Bulletin is
whether an employee welfare benefit plan may exclude or provide
a reduced benefit which is not justified by age related cost consid
erations to retired employees. Employer provided welfare plan
benefits such as group term life insurance and group health insur
ance are sometimes provided to retirees. 119 Since the ADEA only
prohibits discrimination in the context of an employer-employee
relationship,120 employers need not provide welfare plan benefits
116. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(e) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,652 (1979) (preamble to In
terpretative Bulletin).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(c), (0) (1976). Part A (§ 1395(c» entitlement is also avail
able to employees under age 65 who have been entitled to monthly cash benefits for
at least 24 months for disability under social security or the railroad retirement pro
gram. Part A also provides hospital insurance benefits. Part B (§ 1395(0» is a volun
tary contributory supplement benefit program covering physicians services and other
expenses not covered under Part A (§ 1395(c».
118. The specific rules for integrating Medicare benefits with health care plans
are discussed. See text accompanying notes 159-176 infra.
119. D. GREGG & V. LUCAS, LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE HANDBOOK 375,
437-38 (3d ed. 1973); S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, LIFE INSURANCE 403 (9th ed. 1976).
120. ADEA § 4(a)(I); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(I) (1976).
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to former employees or may provide benefits reduced in excess of
reductions justified by age related cost considerations.
IV.

A.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S AND EEOC's INTERPRETATIONS
OF SECTION 4(f)(2)-THE RULES FOR SPECIFIC TYPES
OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS

Application of Section 4(f)(2) to Welfare Benefit Plans

In formulating its rules for welfare benefit plans,121 the De
partment of Labor has consistently applied its general principle
that age based reductions in employee benefit plans must be jus
tified by actuarially significant cost considerations. Since the EEOC
supports this ,general principle, few changes are likely to be made
by EEOC interpretations for welfare benefit plans. 122
l. Group Term Life Insurance

The common practice of life insurance companies has been to
market group term life insurance policies which provide life insur
ance benefits at a constant level unless the insured had attained a
specified age, frequently age 65. At that time, the benefits either
would be reduced to a percentage (usually 50%) of the amount pay
able through age 65 or would cease eptirely.123
The cost of providing life insurance' coverage increases with
age because of the increased likelihood of mortality. The Interpre
tative Bulletin permits the amount of life insurance coverage to be
reduced to the extent justified by an increase in insurance costs
under either the benefit by benefit approach or the benefit package
approach. 124 The proposed Interpretative Bulletin requires the cost
comparison to be calculated on a year by year basis. 125 The final
Interpretative Bulletin modifies this rule and permits cost compari
sons to be made by comparing average costs for periods of up to

121. Welfare benefit plans are employee benefit plans other than deferred com
pensation or retirement plans. Welfare benefit plans, as defined by ERISA, include a
plan which provides medical, surgical or hospital care or benefits in the case of sick
ness, accident, disability, death or unemployment; such plans may also include other
.benefits such as vacation or scholarship plans. ERISA § 3(1); 29 U.S.C. lO02(1)
(1976).
122. See note 71 supra.
123. D. GREGG & V. LUCAS, supra note 119, at 375; S.. HEUBNER & K. BLACK,
supra note 119, at 407.
124. 29 C.F.R. ~ 860. 120(f)(l)(i) (1979) (benefit by benefit); id. at § 860.120(f)(2)
(benefit package).
125. 43 Fed. Reg. 43,269 (1978) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(3)).
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five years. 126 This modification was made because of the insurance
industry's longstanding practice of calculating premiums for group
life insurance on the basis of average cost for five-year age brack
ets, rather than on yearly cost. 127 Whatever age bracket is used for
purposes of cost compwison, comparisons of cost must be made for
the immediately preceding age group even if the coverage is equal
for all years up to age 65. 128 While age based reductions are per
mitted, a total cut off of life insurance benefits at any age within
the prohibited group cannot be justified under the benefit by ben
efit approach because the cost of providing life insurance coverage
does not increase so greatly in anyone year as to justify a total ces
sation of coverage. 129 The Interpretative Bulletin, however, makes
clear that life insurance coverage may cease at the earlier of separa
tion from service or age 70. 130
If the employer adopts a group term life insurance plan which
is designed to provide year by year reductions, there will be an an
nual reduction in life insurance coverage beginning at a specified
age, probably at age 65. The preamble to the Interpretative Bulle
tin makes clear that reductions in benefit levels can commence at
any age, not only at 65. 131 The proposed Interpretative Bulletin
stated that the Department of Labor believed standard actuarial ta
bles justified a benefit reduction of 8% each year for employees be
tween 65 and 70. This "safe harbor" was deleted from the final ver
sion of the Interpretative Bulletin without explanation. 132 It may
have been dropped because the Department of Labor was not sure
of the accuracy of the figure. At least one major life insurance com
pany has determined that the annual increased cost of coverage for
its group term life insurance between the ages of 65 and 70 jus
126. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(3) (1979).
127. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,652 (1979) (preamble to Iuterpretative Bulletin).
128. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(3) (1979) (comparing age brackets 65-70
with 60-65 with 55-60).
129. "[A] total denial of life insurance, on the basis of age would not be
justified under a benefit by benefit analysis." 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(b)(I)(i) (1979).
Similarly, the proposed Interpretative Bulletin stated that "expulsion from a life in
surance plan, on the basis of age, would never be justified." 43 Fed. Reg. 43,269
(1978).
130. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(I)(i) (1979).
·131. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,652 (1979).
132. 43 Fed. Reg. 43,269 (1978). Although the proposed eight percent "safe
harbor" was deleted, the final Interpretative Bulletin does state that "all the em
ployee benefit practices specifically permitted under the proposed interpretation
published September 22, 1978, would be in compliance with the final interpretation
published now." 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,657 (1979).
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tifies an increase of approximately 8%. Utilizing this alternative, a
group term life insurance program might provide a constant benefit
of 100% payable through age 64. There would be an 8% reduction
in death benefits at ages 65 through 69. Consequently, the death bene
fit at age 69 would be approximately 66% of the death benefit pay
able at age 65. 133 No death benefit would be payable after age 70.
The Interpretative Bulletin alternatively permits cost justified
benefit reductions on the basis of average costs in five-year age
brackets, rather than on the basis of yearly costS.1 34 Utilizing this
alternative, the group term life insurance benefit would be a con
stant amount until age 65. One major life insurance company has
determined that a reduction of 33% for insureds between the ages
of 65 and 69 can be justified on the basis of five-year age brackets.
Thus, the death benefit between ages 65 and 69 would be 65% of
the benefit payable prior to age 65. No death benefit would be
payable on or after age 70. This single coverage reduction is easier
to administer and simpler to communicate to employees. Addition
ally, there may be a financial advantage. If most active employees
retire on or before age 67~, the single reduction should be less ex
pensive for the employer when compared to the costs of a year by
year reduction beginning at age 65.
Other variations in reductions are possible. It is permissible
and more expensive for an employer to provide a fixed unreduced
death benefit until age 70. Furthermore, any other variation in
group term life insurance costs which is more generous than that
justified by age related cost considerations is also permitted.
Often the amount of group term life insurance benefit payable
is based on employee wages or salaries or a multiple thereof, such
as two times annual compensation. 135 The preamble to the Inter
pretative Bulletin notes that increases in the cost of coverage for
older workers which are generated by increases in wages or salaries
cannot be taken into account for purposes of calculating age based
increases in COSt.1 3S Consequently, when life insurance coverage is
expressed as a multiple of salary for emp'loyees age 64 or less, the
multiple and not the dollar amount of coverage must be reduced
133. The eight percent reduction is eight percent of the prior year's amount.
Thus the death benefit to age 64 would be 100%; at age 65, 92%; at age 66, 84.64%;
at age 67,77.87%; at age 68, 71.64%; and at· age 69 or later, 65.91%.
134. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(i) (1979).
135. D. GREGG & V. LUCAS, supra note 119, at 358; S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK,
supra note 119, at 404.
136. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648 (1979).
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for older employees. Increases in salary for employees 65 or older
must generate increased life insurance coverage. The reason for
this rule is that salary generated increases are not directly related
to age.
In addition to the death benefit, two ancillary benefits custom
arily provided under a group life insurance contract were not ad
dressed specifically in the Interpretative Bulletin. There is confu
sion as to how these benefits should be treated. The first of these
ancillary benefits is a waiver of premium benefit. Typically, em
ployers will discontinue premium payments on an employee whose
active employment has terminated due to total disability. Further
more, disabled persons are frequently unable to convert their
group term life insurance into individual life insurance for financial
reasons. A waiver of premium protects the benefits of disabled em
ployees. The typical waiver of premium benefit will permit the dis
abled employee's life insurance coverage to remain in force if the
employee becomes totally disabled while covered under the group
insurance plan and remains disabled until death. 137 Waiver of pre
mium provisions, however, typically require the employee to be
under age 60 at the date of commencement of his total disabil
ity.138 If disability occurs after age 60, the employer may treat the
disabled employee as an active employee and continue paying the
necessary monthly premiums to the insurer. More likely, the em
ployer will stop paying premiums for the disabled employee and
coverage will cease. If the waiver of premium benefit is considered
a disability benefit, then by analogy to the rules pertaining to long
term disability benefits described below,139 it is unlawful to cut off
disability waiver of premium benefits when an employee reaches
age 60. On the other hand, the amount of death benefit is not nec
essarily affected by the existence or nonexistence of the waiver of
premium provision. The continuation of the group life insurance
death benefit is a function of the employer's willingness to continue
premium payments. The waiver of premium provision is merely a
financial arrangement between the employer and the insurer which
relates only to the payment of premiums. Therefore, it is not
within the scope of section 4(£)(2).
Another common ancillary benefit provided under group term
137. D. GREGG &
BLACK, LIFE INSURANCE

v.

LUCAS, supra note 119, at 374-75; S.
567-68 (8th ed. 1972).
138. See note 130 supra.
139. See text accompanying notes 136-158 infra.
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life insurance plans is the accidental death and dismemberment
benefit (AD&D). The AD & D benefit pays additional amounts of
benefit in case of accidental death. It also pays benefits for bodily
dismemberment. The most common approach is to express the ac
cidental death and dismemberment benefit as a percentage of the
basic group life insurance benefit. This coverage provides a double
indemnity feature. 140
If AD & D benefits are classified as part of the life insurance
benefit, such age based reductions are permissible. The definition
of "benefit" under the Interpretative Bulletin, however, leads one
to conclude to the contrary. The Bulletin states "Adjustments made
on a benefit-by-benefit basis must be made in the amount or level
of a specific form of benefit for a specific event or contingency. "141
The Interpretative Bulletin, therefore, appears to classify accidental
dismemberment coverage as a health or disability benefit rather
than a life insurance benefit since the event requiring payment of
the benefits is not death. Similarly, the contingency requiring pay
ment of accidental death benefit is accidental death. Consequently,
age based reductions based on the rising incidence of all deaths
may be inappropriate.
The Interpretative Bulletin requires, as a general matter, that
benefits different in form or payable because of a different contin
gency be independently justified by age related cost considera
tions. 142 While the Interpretative Bulletin permits cost justified re
ductions in the amount of group life insurance benefit, it does not
indicate whether corresponding reductions may be made in AD
& D benefits. 143 One might conclude that age based reductions in
14.0. For example, the full principal sum for which the employee is insured un
der the group life insurance benefit is payable if the employee dies as a result of an
accident. For the loss of a hand at or above the wrist, or the loss of a foot by sever
ance at or about the ankle, or for irrevocable loss of the sight of an eye, only one-half
of the principal sum is payable. For the loss of more than one member in anyone ac
cident, the full principal sum is available. Multiple benefits are payable as a result of
anyone accident, but not in 'excess of the principal sum. Thus, the amount of benefit
payable upon accidental death or dismemberment is a function of the percentage of
group term life insurance benefit upon which the accidental death and dismember
ment benefits are based, for example, 100% or 50% of the life insurance benefit.
When a group life insurance contract reduces the amount of term life insurance
death benefit payable starting at a specified age, there will be a corollary reduction
in the amount of accidental death and dismemberment benefits payable. See D.
GREGG & V. LUCAS, supra note 119, at 386-88; S. HEUBNER & K. BLACK, supra note
119, at 407.
141. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(2)(i) (1979) (emphasis added).
142. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,651 (1979).
143. Although the Department of Labor was requested to clarify the treatment
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AD & D benefits, which are a function of life insurance reductions,
are not pennitted by the Interpretative Bulletin. Another possibil
ity is that the Interpretative Bulletin was not intended to regulate
ancillary benefits.
2.

Long-Tenn Disability

Long-term disability plans are designed to provide partial re
placement of earnings during periods of disability caused byac
cident or sickness. Typically, long-tenn disability income bene
fits commence after salary continuance payments cease or after a
specified waiting period. The amount of benefit is usually a fixed
percentage of the employee's pay and continues while the em
ployee remains disabled. There is, however, a maximum duration
of time. The most common durations of benefits have been five
years, ten years, or to age 65. 144 Many long-tenn disability plans
provide benefits until the employee reaches age 65. This has been
justified traditionally because disabled employees often are entitled
at age 65 to nonnal retirement benefits from an employer spon
sored pension plan and from social security. One source of provid
ing for lost income is replaced simultaneously with another source.
Another reason for curtailing disability benefits for ages over 65 is
that detennination of disability for older employees is difficult. In
finnities of age and disability become hard to distinguish.
No age discrimination problems arise when the disability plan
covers individuals for a fixed period of time or for life regardless of
age. 145 Discrimination problems do arise, however, with plans
which provide benefits until a specific age less than 70. The Inter
pretative Bulletin expressly rejects disability plans which cut off
disability payments at age 65. 146 Under the Interpretative Bulletin,
an employer may tenninate disability benefits or coverage on the
basis of age at 70. Further, reductions on the basis of age prior to
70 may be made either in the level of disability benefits or in the
duration of disability benefits. Reduction in either the level of
benefits or the duration of benefits, however, must be justified by
of accidental death and dismemberment and waiver of premium benefits in com
ments to the proposed Interpretative Bulletin, the final Interpretative Bulletin is si
lent on this point. Joint Letter from the American Council of Life Insurance and the
Health Insurance Association of America to Francis V. LaRufTer, Jr., Wage and Hour
Division, Department of Labor (Nov. 27, 1978).
144. 43 Fed. Reg. 43,266 (1978) (preamble to Proposed Interpretative Bulletin);
D. GREGG & V. LUCAS, supra note 119, at 404.
145. 43 Fed. Reg. 43,266 (1978) (preamble to Proposed Interpretative Bulletin).
146. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(I)(iii) (1979).
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age related cost considerations. 147 Either the benefit by benefit ap
proach or the benefit package approach may be used.
U sing a benefit by benefit analysis, four alternative patterns of
disability benefits are permitted by the Interpretative Bulletin. The
first alternative is to provide long-term disability coverage to all
employees until age 70. Since the upper limit of the protected
age group is 70, cessation of benefits at that time is obviously
permitted. 148
The second alternative is to provide long-term disability bene
fits to employees through age 70, concomitantly reducing the level
of benefits for older workers. These benefit reductions, however,
must be cost justified. The Interpretative Bulletin provides no indi
cation as to what level of reduction would be justified between
ages 65 and 70, except to say that a total cut off of disability bene
fits at older ages is not permissible. 149
The third alternative is to reduce the duration of benefits for
older workers in accordance with a safe harbor rule established by
the Department of Labor in its Interpretative Bulletin. 1so Specifi
cally, the duration of disability benefits may be reduced: With re
spect to disability benefits which occur at age 60 or less, by causing
disability benefits to cease at age 65; and with respect to disabili
ties which occur after age 60, by causing benefits to cease five
years after disablement or at age 70, whichever occurs first.
This pattern of benefits is referred to as a safe harbor. The
Department of Labor will not require the employer to justify the
termination of long-term disability payments on the basis of age re
lated cost factors, if the employer adopts this alternative. 151 The
safe harbor alternative was developed because the Department of
Labor recognized the unfairness to employers of requiring long
term disability benefits to continue until age 70. 152 Requiring pay
ments until age 70 assumes that a worker who suffered a long-term
disability would, in absence of a disability, work until age 70, even
though the employee's entitlement to full retirement benefits be
gins at an earlier age. Many, if not most, employees would have
voluntarily left the work force prior to age 70 had they not become
147. [d.
148. [d.
149. [d.
150. [d.
151. Id.
152. 43 Fed. Reg. 43,264, 43,266-67 (1978) (preamble to Proposed Interpreta
tive Bulletin).
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disabled. The safe harbor rule establishes an assumed probable re
tirement age for employees who become disabled at various ages.
In the preamble to the proposed Interpretative Bulletin, the De
partment of Labor recognized that its safe harbor is subject to criti
cism because it relies on age stereotypes. 153
The fourth alternative is to reduce the duration of benefits to
older employees based upon other patterns of benefits justified by
age related cost data. 154 The preamble to the Interpretative Bulle
tin gives the following example of the pattern of benefits estab
lished by one insurer: 155
Age of Disablement
61 or younger

62
63

Duration of Benefits
(in years)
To age 65
3% years
3

64
65
66
67

2%

68

IIf.a
1

69

2
1%
1%

The Department of Labor, however, did not endorse this pattern
of disability benefits.15s Consequently, it or any other pattern es
tablished by an employer or an insurance company still must be
justified by age related cost data.
There are significant differences in costs between the vari
ous possible alternatives. Obviously, continuing long-term disabil
ity benefits unreduced to age 70 is the most expensive alternative.
While the Department of Labor's safe harbor alternative is less ex
pensive, patterns of reduced benefits or reduced duration of bene
fits offered by various insurance companies may represent the least
costly alternatives.
Another important cost saving measure is to have the long
term disability plan offset benefits payable upon disability from
other sources. This will serve to reduce the long-term benefits oth
153. Id. at 43,267.
154. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(I)(iii) (1979).
155. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,655 (1979). This pattern was suggested by "the in
surance company [Union Mutual] which provides group long-term disability insur
ance to more employers than any other insurer in the United States." Id.
156. Id.
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erwise payable under the long-term disability policy. Other sources
of replacement income which have traditionally been taken into ac
count by long-term disability fplans are: Worker's compensation, so
cial security disability and retirement benefits, veterans' pensions,
employer's pension plan disability benefits, and individually pur
. chased disability income policies. 157 Long-term disability plans typ
ically pay large amounts of benefits over extended periods. Thus,
integration of disability benefits with payments from other sources
is important in order to avoid making the total of replacement in
come benefits more attractive than an employee's normal earnings.
As indicated, the Interpretative Bulletin permits integration with
government paid benefits, provided that when government fi
nanced benefits are included, older employees enjoy no less of a
total benefit' than younger employees. 158 The preamble to the In
terpretative Bulletin notes that the principle of integration applies
to Medicare, social security disability and retirement benefits, and
"other such government provided benefits. "159 Based on this,.it ap
pears that long-term disability plans may continue to account for
social security disability income benefits. Presumably, state work
er's compensation disability benefits also may be included. The In
terpretative Bulletin fails to consider whether disability benefits
purchased by the employee may be taken into account. It also fails
to consider whether a long-term disability plan may take into ac
count social security retirement benefits as well as social security
disability benefits. Since the Social Security Act only pays disability
benefits until age 65 and pays retirement benefits after age 65,
a long-term disability plan should be able to take into account so
cial security retirement benefits. 160
The most serious integration problem created by the Interpre
tative Bulletin is coordination of employer sponsored retirement
plan benefits with employer sponsored long-term disability bene
fits. Traditionally, long-term disability benefits ceased at age 65
when it was anticipated the employee would commence to receive
employee retirement benefits. The Interpretative Bulletin, how
ever, specifically rejects cessation of long-term disability benefits at
age 65, unless justified by age related cost considerations, even
157. D. GREGG & V. LUCAS, supra note 119.
158. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(e) (1979).
159. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,652 (1979).
160. Social Security Act, § 223(a)(I)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(I)(B) (1976). Might
one argue that integrating Social Security retirement benefits wi¢ a disability plan
violates the benefit by benefit rule? See 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(2)(i) (1979).
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if the employee commences to receive retirement benefits. 161 In
stead, disability benefits often will be required to continue beyond
age 65. The Interpretative Bulletin attempts to deal with the prob
lem of over utilization of benefits which will occur if an employee
can claim both disability benefits and retirement benefits concur
rently. An obvious and undesirable moral hazard is created when
ever total income replacement benefits approximate or exceed an
individual's earnings. The Interpretative Bulletin takes the position
that retirement benefits need not commence Jlntil disability bene
fits cease. 162 This approach, however, has an ERISA related prob
lem. Internal Revenue Code section 401(a)(14) and ERISA section
206(a) provide that a participant in a pension plan, unless he or she
elects otherwise, must commence to receive benefits no later than
60 days after the later of the end of the plan year in which the par
ticipant reaches normal retirement age or when the participant ter
minates service with the employer. The Interpretative Bulletin
provides, however, that an employee receiving long-term disability
benefits may b'e deemed by the employer not to have "actually re
tired," that is, terminated service. Therefore, benefits need not be
paid simultaneously.163 This interpretation resolves the conflict be
tween the Interpretative Bulletin and ERISA. Since the Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor has no authority to reg
ulate ERISA or the Internal Revenue Code, however, its resolu
tion of the conflict created by the Interpretative Bulletin remains
open to question.
Assuming this coordination of retirement and disability bene
fits does not violate ERISA, qualified retirement plans could be
amended to provide that retirement benefits will not commence
until long-term disability benefits cease. 164 Long-term disability
plans, in tum, might permit an employee to elect voluntarily to
161. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(iii) (1979).
162. ld. at § 860.120(f)(1)(iv)(B)(6); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,656, 30,661 (1979) (pream
ble to Interpretative Bulletin).
163. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(iv)(B)(6) (1979). This interpretation is inconsistent
with the Department of Labor's ERISA regulation which requires employers to
credit "hours of service" for eligibility, participation and vesting purposes under a
pension benefit plan up to a maximum of 501 hours. Id: at § 2530.200b-2(a)(2)(i).
164. Will the amendment of a qualified retirement plan to defer receipt of re
tirement benefits until disability benefits cea~e cause an illegal forfeiture under
I.R.C. § 411(a)(1O)? See Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-8(c) (1977) which prohibits indirect re
ductions in vested benefits through amendments. See also·I.R.C. § 411(a)(3)(B) on
suspension of benefits upon the reemployment of a retiree. Was I.R.C. § 411(a)(3)(B)
intended to be the exclusive mle permitting suspensions?
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terminate long-term disability benefits in order that retirement
benefits might commence immediately at normal retirement age.
An election to terminate long-term disability benefits would be ad
vantageous to an employee whose monthly benefit under the quali
fied retirement plan was greater than his or her monthly benefit
under the long-term disability plan.
There is a second alternative. Long-term disability benefits
could be directly offset by the amount of retirement benefits re
ceived under the quatified retirement plan. As indicated above, the
offset of employee retirement benefits has been fairly common un
der long-term disability plans. Although this offset approach does
not avoid the need to make concurrent payments, it does eliminate
the financial incentive to seek classification as a disabled employee
at retirement plan. There is no tax: qualification problem, since the
offset is applied to reduce benefits under the long-term disability
plan and not the qualified retirement plan.1 65 The offset approach
may, however, be in violation of the Interpretative Bulletin. There
is a substantial argument that an offset in formula constitutes a
benefit package approach and retirement plan benefits may not be
coupled with other benefits under the benefit package approach. 166
Many retirement plans pay long-term disability benefits if an
employee becomes totally disabled prior to retirement date. As
suming that the Interpretative Bulletin prohibits an offset of em
ployee pension plan benefits, there appears to be no reason why
disability benefits provided under the employer's retirement plan
could not be offset under a benefit package approach. 167
3. Health Insurance
Although the cost of health insurance almost certainly varies
by age, the Interpretative Bulletin does not offer any specific
guidelines on reduction of health insurance benefits prior to age

165. Rev. Rul. 578, 1971-2 C.B. 207 concludes that a qualified plan's disability
retirement benefit may not be offset by a nonqualified disability benefit paid to the
same employee. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(5) (1978) which requires contributions or bene
fits in a qualified plan to bear a uniform relationship to compensation, but permits
employer contributions to Social Security to be taken into account. Accord, Treas.
Reg. § 1.401-4 (1963); Rev. Rul. 446, 1971-2 C.B. 187.
166. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(2)(ii) (1979). The author understands that the EEOC
is reviewing the "offset" approach to determine whether to permit its use.
167. Qualified pension and profit sharing plans are permitted to provide bene
fits to a participant who becomes disabled. IRS PUBL. No. 778 pt. 5(m) (1972); Treas.
Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(ii) (1979).
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65. 168 The preamble to the Interpretative Bulletin notes that
because health insurance coverage does not ordinarily vary sig
nificantly by age up to age 65 and because of the wide variety of
health insurance plans currently marketed, the Department of La
bor found it difficult to offer guidelines as to when reductions in
coverage might be justified. 169 The Interpretative Bulletin simply
states that health insurance benefit reductions may not be concen
trated in certain items to make coverage less attractive for older
workers.17o Reductions in health insurance, however, only may be
justified under the benefit by benefit approach.l71
The Department of Labor found that health insurance cover
age often ceased at the mandatory retirement age of 65. Further
more, even when coverage continued after age 65 it was reduced
because of Medicare. 172 In view of the availability of Medicare
starting at age 65, the Interpretative Bulletin takes the position
that reductions in total health benefits, that is, Medicare plus em
ployer sponsored health insurance benefits, for employees age 65
to 70 generally are not justified. 173 Consequently, coordination of
benefits with government sponsored health plans continues to be
permissible.
The insurance industry has developed two general approaches
dealing with Medicare coverage. 174 First, the employer's health in

168. 29 C.F.R. § 860. 120(f)(1), (2) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,654 (1979)
(preamble to Interpretative Bulletin).
169. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(l)(ii) (1979). Health insurance plans do not custom
arily reduce benefit amounts paid to older workers, but do integrate benefits with
Medicare. Consequently, the Department of Labor was unable to offer guidance on
actuarially justified cost reductions in health insurance plans.
170. [d.
171. [d. at (f)(2)(iii). The prohibition on the use of the benefit package ap
proach for health care benefits is based upon a statement by Representative Waxman
(D., Cal.) that reductions in health benefits to older workers should not be made in
"the absence of actuarial data which clearly demonstrates that the costs of this serv
ice are uniquely burdensome to the employer." 124 CONGo REc. H2,227 (daily ed.
Mar. 21, 1978), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,656 (1979) (preamble to the In
terpretative Bulletin).
172. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,653 (1979) (preamble to Interpretative Bulletin).
See also D. GREGG & V. LUCAS, supra note 119, at 438.
173. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(ii)(C) (1979). The Interpretative Bulletin how
ever, does not preclude a reduction in total health care benefits for employees ages
65 to 70. The burden is on the employer, however, to produce "sound and specific
cost data to justify a reduction." 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,654 (1979). This appears to
be stricter than the general standard requiring that costs be "valid and reasonable."
See 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(1) (1979).
174. S. HEUBNER & K. BLACK, supra note 119, at 224-25.
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surance plan can "carve out" Medicare benefits. Under the "carve
out" approach, health insurance plan benefits are directly offset by
benefits paid under Medicare. 175 Employees over age 65 receive
the same dollar amount of health insurance benefits from the
health insurance plan and Medicare as employees under age 65 re
ceive from the health insurance plan alone.
Health insurance contracts utilizing the "carve out" approach
contain a general exclusion of any expenses eligible for reimburse
ment under Medicare or, in some contracts, an exclusion for ex
penses actually reimbursed under Medicare. The distinction be
tween excluding eligible Medicare expenses and actual Medicare
expenses is significant because Part B of the federal Medicare
law 176 provides coverage for doctors' and surgeons' fees on an op
tional basis requiring individual contributions towards the costs.1 77
The second approach is to have the employer's health care
plan supplement Medicare. A supplemental plan does not offset
Medicare benefits, but rather, it is designed to cover specific ex
penses not covered under Medicare. 178 Typically, a supplemental
plan is a separate health insurance plan distinct from the employ
er's regular medical plan. This separate plan supplements Medicare
benefits payable to employees age 65 or older. Supplemental plans
are designed to provide the same total medical benefits with Medi
care as is provided to younger employees through the regular med
ical plan. Since a supplemental plan anticipates which benefits
Medicare will pay, it is possible that in certain instances employees
over 65 might not receive the same total benefits as employees un
der age 65.1 79
The Interpreta~!ve Bulletin permits employers to coordinate
their health plans with benefits provided by Medicare either by a
"carve out" approach or by a supplemental plan approach. In
175. 29 C.F.R. § 860. 120(f)(1)(ii)(A) (1979).
176. Subchapter XVIII entitled, "Health Insurance for Aged and Disabled, Part
B-Supplementing Medical Insurance Benefits for Aged and Disabled of the Social
Security Act Amendments of 1965." 42 U.S.C. § 1395(j)-(w) (1976).
177. [d. at § 1395(r).
178. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(ii)(A) (1979).
179. The preamble to the Interpretative Bulletin gives the following two exam
ples: If Medicare pays less for professional services than was anticipated by the
health insurer in designing the supplemental plan, the over age 65 employee will
receive less total benefits. If prescription drugs are not covered under the regular
health plan for employees of less than age 65 who are not covered by Medicare, but
are covered by the supplemental plan for employees over age 65, then the over age
65 employee will receive more total benefits. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,654 (1979).
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response, however, to concerns that supplemental plans may not
fully anticipate benefits not paid under Medicare, the Department
of Labor places two conditions on the use of supplemental plans.
First, the supplemental plan must cost the employer no less than a
"carve out" plan would. Second, together with Medicare benefits,
the supplemental plan must provide no less favorable benefits than
a "carve out" plan. 180 As a practical matter, an employer will have
difficulty demonstrating that he has satisfied both conditions. 18l
These two conditions make the supplemental plan less desirable to
employers than a "carve out" plan.
The Interpretative Bulletin requires any employer sponsoring
a health insurance plan which offsets Medicare benefits, including
optional Part B benefits, to inform each eligible employee of the
need to apply for Medicare coverage and to provide any necessary
assistance in the application procedure. 182 Yet, the Interpretative
Bulletin fails to indicate when and how notice of eligibility for
Medicare Part B is to be given. 183 More importantly, employers
may be required to subsidize fully or partially the employee costs
for Medicare Part B. Specifically, when the health insurance plan
requires no employee contribution or an employee contribution
less than that required for Part B coverage,184 the employer must
payor contribute towards the Part B cost to make the total benefits
available on terms which are no less favorable for employees over
65 than for employees under 65. 185 The employer's total contribu
180. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(ii)(A) (1979).
181. There is no standard "carve out" plan with standard costs with which to
make a comparison. Costs among "carve out" plans vary from insurer to insurer. The
costs of plans of the same insurer may also vary with the claims experience. Also,
contract language is not uniform. Deductibles, maximums, coinsurance, exclusions
and limitations vary. See D. GREGG & V. LUCAS, supra note 119, at 413-32.
182. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(ii)(B) (1979).
183. Is a general notice posted at a worksite sufficient or is individual notifica
tion required? If individual notification is required may the disclosure be made as
part of the summary plan description already required by ERISA? ERISA §§ 102,
l04(b)(l)-(c), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1022, 1024(b)(1)-(c) (1976); 29 C.F.R. §§ 2520.102-2, -3, -4
to .104b-2 (1979). How long prior to age 65 should the disclosure be made? How
much assistance is required?
184. As of July 1, 1979, Part B coverage cost each individual enrolled $8.70 per
month; as of July 1, 1980 the cost will rise 90 cents to $9.60. Currently some 28 mil
lion people have enrolled in Medicare Part "B." [1979] 1 UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH)
11 13, 847.
185. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(ii)(B) (1979). Many health insurance plans provide
coverage for dependents, including spouses. The Interpretative Bulletin fails to indi
cate whether an employer is obligated to pay the spouse's Part B premium if the em
ployer provides coverage for dependents.
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tions for Part B in the health insurance plan, however, do not have
to be greater than the employer's highest contribution for health
benefits for employees of any age under 65. 186
The Interpretative Bulletin's rule on Medicare Part B subsi
dies is based on the general principle of equal benefits for employ
ees. It may be possible, however, to have an integrated health care
plan which satisfies section 4(f)(2) based on the equal cost unequal
benefit principle.t87 An employer could establish an employer pay
all health plan which is integrated with Medicare benefits. The em
ployer agrees to pay the full cost of the health insurance premium
plus all of the Medicare Part B. Under the equal cost principle, it
should be possible to provide age related cost justified reduced
coverage under the health insurance plan for the older employee.

B. Application of Section 4(j)(2) to Retirement Plans
Benefits provided under retirement plans 188 are not subject to
the otherwise uniform interpretation by the Department of Labor
under section 4(f)(2) that age based reductions in employee beneMedicare Part B costs paid by the employer are excluded from the employees
income. Rev. Rul. 67-360, 1967-2 C.B. 71.
186. For example, assume the monthly employee contributions with no de
pendents for group health insurance coverage for employees of a plan is $10. The
employer monthly contribution for employees 65 years of age or older is $15. The
employer's highest contribution for health insurance benefits for employees of any
age under 65 is $20. The health care plan offsets Medicare benefits including Part B
benefits. The monthly premium for Medicare Part B is $8.70. The Interpretative Bul
letin requires the employer to pay both the group health insurance contribution for
the employee age 65 years or older plus the Medicare Part B premium ($15 plus
$8.70 or $23.70). The Interpretative Bulletin provides, however, that contributions
for Part B in the health insurance plan do not have to be greater than the employer's
highest contribution for health insurance benefits for employees of any age under 65
(here $20). Thus, the employer will have to subsidize $5 of the $8.70 contribution for
Medicare Part B ($20 - $15 = $5).
187. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(2)(ii)(C) (1979); note 162 supra.
188. Retirement plans include, but are apparently not limited to, retirement
plans subject to title I of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144 (1976). See 43 Fed. Reg.
43,264, 43,267 (1978) (preamble to Proposed Interpretative Bulletin). ERISA § 3(2),
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1976) defines employee pension benefit plan to include a plan
sponsored by an employer which provides retirement income to employees, or re
sults in the deferral of income by employees extending to termination of employ
ment or beyond. As such, it includes both qualified retirement plans and non
qualified deferred compensation plans. A qualified plan is a plan described in I.R.C.
§§ 401-415 and includes pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, and annuity plans.
ERISA further subdivides employee pension plans as being either defined contribu
tion plans or defined benefit plans. ERISA §§ 3(34)-(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34)-(35)
(1976). The Interpretative Bulletin and this article separately considers defined con
tribution and defined benefit plans.
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fits must be justified by actuarially significant cost considera
tions. 189 This departure from the equal cost or equal benefit princi
ple is based on the legislative history of the 1978 amendments.
Congress made it clear that the 1978 amendments would in no way
interfere with the operation of relevant provisions of ERISA.
ERISA, in effect, permits employers to stop pension credits at age
65 or at the normal retirement date of the plan. 190 Specifically,
Congress understood that the 1978 amendments would not change
the definition of normal retirement age under ERISA.191 Further
more, Congress understood that the 1978 amendments would not
require the accrual of additional benefits or the payment of the ac
tuarial equivalent of normal retirement benefits to employees who
choose to work beyond normal retirement age.
The EEOC is considering changes in the Department of La
bor's rules for pension plans because it believes these rules create
an employer windfall at the expense of employees working beyond
age 65. The EEOC, however, may be reluctant to propose rule
changes because such changes will cause conflicts with ERISA, are
contrary to the legislative history of the 1978 amendments, and will
be at odds with the Interpretative Bulletin in which the EEOC
concurred. The changes being considered are more fully described
below.
1. Defined Benefit Plans
The greatest cost differences with respect to age can be shown
under a defined benefit pension plan. 192 Congress has already ac
189. See 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,649 (1979) (preamble to Interpretative Bulle
tin).
190. S. REp. supra note 112. See also Letter from Asst. Sec. of Labor for Em
ployment Standards, Donald Elisburg to Senator Williams, reprinted in id. at 14-16.
An identical letter was also sent to Congressman Hawkinsl This letter is reprinted in
123 CONGo REe. H9977 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1977). (hereinafter cited as the Elisburg
letter). The Elisburg letter is the key document in the legislative history of the 1978
amendments on the application of the amendments to defined benefit plans. The
Elisburg letter was scrupulously followed by the Department of Labor in the Inter
pretative Bulletin. The EEOC is now contemplating modification of the approaches
set forth in the letter. See text accompanying notes 232-37 infra.
191. S. REP. supra note 112, at 5; Elisburg letter, supra note 190.
192. A defined benefit plan is a pension plan which specifies the retirement
benefits payable or the method of determining the benefits but not the employer
contributions. For example, a defined benefit plan may promise a specified amount
per month at retirement (flat benefit), a stated percentage of compensation (a fixed
benefit), or a stated percentage of compensation times years of service (unit benefit).
See ERISA § 3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (1976); I.R.C. § 414(j). Employer contribu
tions under a defined benefit plan are determined actuarially on the basis of the re
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knowledged the unfairness of requiring employers to fund the high
cost of benefits for employees hired at older ages as part of ERISA.
Under ERISA, there is an exemption from the minimum participa
tion requirements permitting employers to exclude from defined
benefit pension plans or from target benefit pension plans any em
ployee hired at an age less than five years prior to normal retire
ment age. 193 Similarly, ERISA is sensitive to employer costs for
older employees under its minimum vesting rules. While ERISA
requires full vesting for employees who reach normal retirement
age,194 normal retirement age for vesting purposes is defined as
the earlier of (1) the normal retirement age specified under the
plan, (2) age 65 or (3) the tenth anniversary of the beginning of par
ticipation. 195 Consequently, ERISA permits plans to delay full
vesting for employees who begin participation after age 55 for a
ten-year period.
Finally, ERISA provides for three alternative minimum ac
crued benefit methods. Two methods, the 1331f:J% and the frac
tional methods, permit, but do not require, accruals to cease at
normal retirement age. 196 The third, the 3% method, requires ac
cruals to continue during active employment, including years after
normal retirement age, up to a maximum of 331f:J years. 197
Since there is no explicit statutory statement of the equal cost
or equal benefit principle, the legislative history becomes of critical
importance when judging whether defined benefit plans discrimi
nate against older employees because their benefits cannot be jus
tified by age related cost considerations. The most significant as
pect of the legislative history is a letter from Assistant Secretary of
Labor for Employment Standards Donald Elisburg to Congressman
Augustus Hawkins and Senator Harrison Williams. This letter in
terpreted the 1978 amendments as not conflicting with ERISA
rules governing defined benefit plans. 198
tirement benefits expected to become payable. ERISA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 1082
(1976); I.R.C. § 412.
193. ERISA § 202(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(2) (1976): I.R.C. § 410(a)(2); Treas.
Reg. § 1.410(a)-4(a)(1) (1979).
194. ERISA § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1976); I.R.C. § 411(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.411
(a)-l(a)(l) (1979).
195. ERISA § 3(24),29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1976); I.R.C. § 411(a)(8); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.411(a)-7(b) (1979).
196. ERISA § 204(b)(1)(B)-(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(B)-(C) (1976); I.R.C. § 411(b)
(l)(B)-(C); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(b)-1(b)(2)(ii)(E)-(3)(ii)(C) (1979).
197. ERISA § 204(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § lO54(b)(l)(A) (1976); I.R.C. § 411
(b)(l)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(b)-1(b)(1)(i) (1979).
198. See note 190 supra. The letter was provided by Elisburg in response to
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The Elisberg letter was incorporated into the Senate Com
mittee Report and the Congressional Record as part of the legisla
tive history.199 Furthermore, both the House and Senate Commit
tee Reports contain statements of legislative intent which express
the same view of the 1978 amendments as is expressed in the
Elisberg letter.2oo In particular, the Elisberg letter provided: (1)
Employers need not credit years of service for purposes of benefit
accrual after normal retirement age; (2) employers are not required
to pay the actuarial equivalent of normal retirement benefits to an
employee who continues to work beyond normal retirement age;
(3) retirement benefits can be deferred after normal retirement age
until actual retirement; (4) an increase in the upper age limit of the
protected group to 70 will not increase funding costs for pension
plans; and (5) the failure to provide benefit accruals for employees
who remain employed after normal retirement age will not consti
tute age discrimination under the AD EA. 201
The Interpretative Bulletin harmonizes its rules with the re
quirements of ERISA and the legislative history of the 1978
amendments. Under the Department of Labor's Interpretative Bul
letin, there are five basic rules regarding plan participants who
continue in employment after having attained the normal retire
ment age specified in the plan.
First, defined benefit plans are not required to credit for pur
poses of benefit accrual those years of service which occur after an
employee has attained the normal retirement age specified in the
plan. 202 Second, plans are not required to pay the actuarial equiva
lent of normal retirement benefits to an employee who continues
to work beyond the normal retirement age specified in the plan. 203
Third, all variables used in computing the accrued benefit of an
employee may be frozen at normal retirement age. Specifically,

five questions posed by the Senate Committee which was clearly concerned about
potential conflict with ERISA. Letter from Senators Williams & Javits to Donald
Elisburg, Asst. Sec. of Labor (Aug. 29, 1977), reprinted in S. REP. supra note 112 at
13-14.
199. See note 187 supra.
200. H.R. REP. No. 527, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1977); S. REP. supra note 112
at 5.
201. Elisburg letter, supra note 190.
202. 29 C.F.R. § 860. 120(f)( 1)(iv)(B)(3), (5) (1979).
203. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(iv)(B)(4) (1979). Neither ERISA nor the I.R.C. re
quires a defined benefit plan to actuarially adjust upwards benefits for employees
who work beyond a plan's normal retirement date. See Treas. Reg. § 1.4U(c)-1(f)(2)
( 1979).
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plans may disregard salary increases and benefit improvements oc
curring after normal retirement age for employees working beyond
that age. 204 While a defined benefit does not have to consider com
pensation increases in benefit changes after a person reaches nor
mal'retirement date, the plan must assure that employees who
continue to work beyond normal retirement age are treated as well
as similarly situated employees who retire. Thus, if a benefit im
provement is given to retirees, such as a cost of living adjustment,
the plan must give the same benefit improvement to employees
who continue to work beyond normal retirement age. 205 Similarly,
defined benefit plans with social security offset formulas, which do
not continue to accrue benefits for service after normal retirement
age or which do not provide benefit improvements to employees
working beyond normal retirement age, must freeze the amount of
social security offset at the time benefit accruals ceased. 206 Thus, if
years of service or benefit accruals in a benefit formula are frozen
because of age at normal retirement age, the social security offset
must also be frozen at the same age. 207 Social security retirement
benefits are indexed to reflect increases in average wages. 208 The
204. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(iv)(B)(7) (1979). The proposed Interpretative Bul
letin was silent on this point. The final Interpretative Bulletin permits salary and
benefit improvements to be frozen at normal retirement age because "[tlhe 1978 leg
islative history indicates an understanding that no adjustment to an accrued benefit
under a defined benefit plan is required on account of employment after normal re
tirement age." 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,656 (1979) (emphasis added). Defined benefit
plans promise to pay a stated benefit at normal retirement age. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (1978). This stated benefit is called the normal form of benefit and
is usually expressed as a single life annuity. In addition, most plans permit the par
ticipant to elect optional forms of benefits of equal value, but different in amount.
For example, a married participant must be offered a joint and survivor annuity as
the standard form of benefit, unless the participant elects otherwise. ERISA § 205,
29 U.S.C. § 1055 (1976); I.R.C. § 401(a)(1l); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-1l (1979). Other
common optional forms of benefits include a life annuity certain (an annuity payable
for a specified period, such as 5 or 10 years, and after that as long as the participant
lives); a modified cash refund life annuity (an annuity payable for life with an agree
ment to pay a lump sum to the beneficiary in an amount by which the employee pro
vided accrued benefit exceeds the payments made to the employee); and a cash, one
sum payment. The quoted statement in the preamble suggests that optional forms
may be frozen as well as the normal form. For example, if a participant were entitled
to elect a $10,000 cash one sum payment at normal retirement age, the participant is
also entitled to elect a $10,000 cash one sum payment at a deferred retirement date.
205. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(iv)(B)(7) (1974); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,656
(1979) (preamble to Interpretative Bulletin).
206. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(iv)(B)(8) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,656
(1979) (preamble to Interpretative Bulletin).
207. See note 206 supra.
208. Social Security Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C.A. § 415 (West Cum.
Supp. 1979).
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Interpretative Bulletin prevents the employer from taking into ac
count any increases in social security benefits to diminish the bene
fits paid by the employer under the defined benefit plan. ERISA
already prevents plans from considering social security increases
after an employee's separation from service. 209 Freezing the social
security offset at normal retirement date assures equal treatment
for employees who continue in employment. They will receive the
same dollar benefit upon retirement as a similarly situated em
ployee who retired at normal retirement age.
Fourth, any employee hired less than five years prior to nor
mal retirement age may be excluded from the defined benefit plan,
and any employee hired after normal retirement age may be ex
cluded from a defined benefit plan. 210 Fifth, a defined benefit plan
may provide, for employees who work beyond normal retirement
age, that retirement benefits will commence at the actual date of
retirement rather than at normal retirement age. 211 Specifically,
employers receiving long-term disability benefits as salary replace
ment may be deemed not to have "actually retired." Therefore,
they need not be simultaneously provided with retirement bene
fits.212 This interpretation attempts to resolve the problem of con
current payment of long-term disability benefits and retirement
benefits to employees who have reached normal retirement age. 213
In summary, the Interpretative Bulletin permits a defined benefit
plan to pay at deferred retirement the same amount of monthly
benefit to which an employee was entitled at normal retirement
date.
209. ERISA § 206(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(b) (1979); I.R.C. § 401(a)(15); Treas.
Reg. § 1.401(a)-(15) (1979).
210. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(I)(iv)(A) (1979). All defined benefit plans, whether
or not subject to ERISA, may exclude employees hired within five years of normal
retirement age. Defined benefit plans, not subject to ERISA, may exclude employees
hired more than five years prior to normal retirement age if the exclusion "is justifia
ble on the basis of cost considerations." Id. Plans subject to ERISA are prohibited
from excluding employees hired at earlier ages. See note 193 supra.
211. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(I)(iv)(6) (1979). ERISA permits commencement of
benefits to be delayed after normal retirement age until a later terminiation of serv
ice. ERISA § 206(a) 29 U.S.C. § 1056(a) (1976); I.R.C. § 401(a)(14); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.401(a)-14(a)(3) (1979). ERISA similarly provides that benefits may be suspended
upon the reemployment of a retiree. ERISA § 203(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3)(B)
(1976); IRL § 411(a)(3)(B): 43 Fed. Reg. 59,098 (1978) (proposed Department of La
bor regulations) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 2530.203-3). The Internal Revenue
Service also allows plans to pay retirement benefits while an employee continues to
work after normal retirement age. Rev. Rul. 71-24, 1971-1 C.B. 114.
212. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(I)(iv)(6) (1979).
213. See text accompanying notes 161-167 supra.
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While many of the Interpretative Bulletin's rules have the ef
fect of increasing employer costs to fund plans, the rules relating to
defined benefit plans do not increase costs. In many cases, plan
costs may be lowered. 214 The higher the retirement age, the lower
the cost of a given amount of retirement benefit will be. For exam
ple, if an employee elects a deferred retirement at age 70 rather
than at the normal retirement age of 65, there is an additional five
year period during which the employee may die. The resulting
possibility is that he or she will never receive benefits. In addition,
retirement at age 70 reduces the length of the benefit period dur
ing which retirement benefits are paid. Finally, since the plan is
not required to provide for additional accrual of benefits after the
participant has reached the plan's normal retirement age, the par
ticipant's added years of service between ages 65 and 70 will not
increase the ultimate retirement benefit paid or the cost of provid
ing it.
When employers decide to provide deferred retirement bene
fits which are more favorable than the benefits required by the In
terpretative Bulletin, plan costs may not be less. There are essen
tially four different methods of handling benefits after age 65. The
four options are outlined in rough order of increasing cost. First,
the benefit level could be frozen at normal retirement age. Thus,
an employee would receive the same dollar benefit he or she
had earned at normal retirement age. This would be true regardless
of how much later he or she actually retired. Second, the benefit
could be changed to reflect salary increases, but with no additional
credits for service after normal retirement age. Third, the deferred
retirement benefit could be increased to reflect service credits as
well as salary and social security increases. Fourth, the deferred
retirement benefit could be actuarially increased. 215
214. The Elisburg letter, supra note 190, addressed the cost issue:
An increase in the upper age limit of the ADEA would not increase the
funding costs for private pension plans. As a matter of fact, financial pres
sure on private pension plans could be alleviated. Requiring an employer to
permit a qualified employee to work until the Act's upper age limit, regard
less of the pension plan's normal retirement age, would result in cost sav
ings to plans rather than increases.
Id., reprinted in S. REP. supra note 112 at 15-16.
The employer cost savings as a result of the 1978 amendments disturbs EEOC
Assistant Commissioner Leach who perceives the cost savings to be at the expense
of older workers. See note 7 supra: text accompanying notes 232-37 infra.
215. Perrins, Foster & Crosby, actuarial consultants, conducted a survey of 60
New England companies during the week of June 4, 1979. This survey revealed that
65% of all employers intended a total freeze of accrued benefits at normal retirement
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The EEOC is actively considering changes in the Department
of Labor's rules for defined benefit plans. 216 The EEOC is consid
ering requiring continued accruals for employees in a plan whose
benefits are not fully accrued by the time the employees reach the
plan's normal retirement age. The EEOC is also considering re
quiring the payment of the actuarial equivalent of a normal retire
ment benefit to an employee who works beyond normal retirement
age. Finally, the EEOC is considering requiring that increases in
compensation and benefit improvements accruing after normal re
tirement age be taken into account when calculating a deferred re
tirement benefit.
The contemplated changes all conflict with the express legisla
tive history of the 1978 amendments. 217 The EEOC, however, be
lieves that the changes are justified by the general rule that age
based reductions must be justified under ADEA by actuarially sig
nificant cost consideration. 218
The EEOC position deserves examination. The actuarially sig
nificant test is derived from the Department of Labor's original
interpretation in 1969 requiring that all employer benefit plans
provide equal benefits or demonstrate that differential benefits
have equal costS. 219 The unequal benefit equal cost half of the prin
ciple was further refined by the Department of Labor in its 1979
Interpretative Bulletin. It required the data used to demonstrate
equal cost to be cost data in which age is an actuarially significant
factor. The EEOC neglects the other half of the principle: equal
benefit unequal cost. A defined benefit plan which pays the same
dollar amount of monthly benefit at deferred retirement date as is
paid at normal retirement date can be justified because of the
equal benefit alternative. Reliance on the equal cost alternative is
date; seven percent will adjust the accrued benefit at normal retirement date for sub
sequent changes in earnings, but not for subsequent service; seventeen percent will
continue to accrue benefits based on both earnings and service after normal retire
ment date; three percent will increase accrued benefits at normal retirement date by
a fixed percentage for each year of delayed retirement or by a factor based on actua
rial equivalents; three percent will adjust accrued benefits at normal retirement date
for continued service, but not for changes in earnings; and five percent of employers
were uncertain or did not answer the question. Letter from A. Norman Crowder, III,
Vice President, Towers, Perrins, Foster & Crosby, Boston Massachusetts to the au
thor (Sept. 10, 1979).
216. EEOC Vice Chairman, Daniel E. Leach discussed what changes are con
templated in a recent speech. See note 7 supra.
217. See text accompanying notes 198-201 supra.
218. Leach's Speech, supra note 7.
219. Id.

430

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. ·2:379

unnecessary. Contrary to the EEOC's position, freezing benefits at
normal retirement age is consistent with the Department of La
bor's historical position of equal benefits or equal costs.
Another point deserves consideration. The equal cost or equal
benefit principle is not a clearly established legal interpretation of
ADEA's section 4(f)(2).220 Equal cost or equal benefits is the De
partment of Labor's interpretation of the meaning of the word "sub
terfuge" in section 4(£)(2). There is no express statutory authority
for, or an explicit statement of, the equal cost or equal benefit
principle in the legislative history of the ADEA. The principle has
been implied by the Department of Labor from a rather ambiguous
legislative history, and its interpretation has been rejected by sev
eral federal courts including the Supreme Court in the McMann 221
decision.
In summary, the Department of Labor in its Interpretative
Bulletin has faithfully followed· the legislative history of the 1978
amendments with respect to qualified defined benefit plans. Its
rules permit accrued benefits to be frozen at normal retirement
age. The EEOC is now contemplating a revision of the rules for
defined benefit plans to require increases in benefits for employees
who defer retirement beyond the normal retirement date. The
EEOC's contemplated revision repudiates the legislative history of
the 1978 amendments and overturns a prior final Interpretative
Bulletin of the Department of Labor. Under the Skidmore stan
dard, an EEOC guideline is judged on "the thoroughness evi
dent in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consis
tency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control. "222
The EEOC contemplated revision "does not fare well under these
standards. "223
2.

Defined Contribution Plans

The Interpretative Bulletin again follows the legislative history
of the 1978 amendments. 224 It states that some, but not all, de
220. See note 2 supra.
221. 434 u.s. at 192. See notes 20-22 supra for the history of the equal cost or
equal benefit principle.
222. 323 U.S. at 140. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
223. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976).
224. Senator Javits (R. N.Y.) made the following statement with which Senator
Williams (D. N.J.) concurred:
[Aln employer will be permitted under the act, as amended, to maintain a
defined contribution plan-other than a plan which is merely supplemental

1980]

AGE DISCRIMINATION

431

fined contribution plans may provide for the cessation of employer
contributions after normal retirement age and excludes from partic
ipation employees at normal retirement age or older.225 Specifi
cally, any defined contribution plan which is not supplemental is
not required to make additional allocations to employees who re
main employed after normal retirement date. A supplemental de
fined contribution plan, on the other hand, may not provide for the
cessation of employer contributions after normal retirement age. 226
Thus, the definition of "supplemental" becomes critical to a
determination of whether or not employer contributions are re
quired to continue under a defined contribution plan after normal
retirement age. The Interpretative Bulletin adopts a mechanical
approach. A defined contribution plan is supplemental with respect
to any employee if an employee participates in both a defined ben
efit plan and a defined contribution plan. 227 When an employer has
no defined benefit plans, but two or more defined contribution
plans, all but one of the defined contribution plans are supplemen
tal with respect to employees covered by all. The employer has
the right to designate which of these plans is not supplemental. 228
If the employer sponsors only one defined contribution plan, the
one plan is nonsupplemental. 229 The test is applied on an emto a defined benefit or defined contribution plan maintained by the
employer-which precludes employer and, if applicable, employee contribu
tions to such plan subsequent to an employee's attainment of the plan's nor
mal retirement age.
124 CONGo REC. S4450 (daily ed. March 23, 1978). In the House, a substantially
identical statement was made by Congressman Dent (D. Pa.) with which Congress
man Hawkins (D. Cal.) concurred. 124 CONGo REC. H2271 (daily ed. March 21,
1978). While the Elisburg letter, supra note 190, is not directly on point since it ap
pears only to address the issues relating to qualified defined benefit plans, it is rea
sonable to assume that both the Department of Labor and Congress intended de
fined contribution plans to receive parallel treatment with defined benefit plans. See
Address by Stephen J. Sacher, Special Counsel to Senate Human Resources Com
mittee, on the legislative history of the 1978 Age Act Amendments, Sept. 18, 1978,
reprinted in [1978] PENS. REP. (BNA) No. 207, at R-4 (Sept. 25, 1978). See also 43
Fed. Reg. 43,265, 43,267-68 (1978) (preamble to proposed Interpretative Bulletin).
225. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(iv)(B)(1) (1979).
226. [d.
227. [d. For a number of legitimate reasons an employer may use a combina
tion of plans rather than one plan to provide retirement benefits. The total contribu
tions and benefits that can be provided to anyone employee, however, is limited by
I.R.C. § 415. See 45 Fed. Reg. 5754-80 (1980) (proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.415). Under
the Interpretative Bulletin, if an employee is a participant in a defined benefit plan
and a profit-sharing plan, the profit-sharing plan is a supplemental plan.
228. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(iv)(B)(1) (1979).
229. [d.
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ployee by employee basis. Specifically, a defined contribution plan
is considered supplemental as to any given employee, only if an
other plan covers that same employee. 230
230. Id; 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,655 (1979) (preamble to Interpretative Bulle
tin). This qualification permits an employer to sponsor two plans for different groups
of employees, such as union and nonunion, or salaried and hourly, without requiring
one plan to be "supplemental."
The Department of Labor left unresolved the status of floor plan arrangements
and target benefit plans. A floor plan arrangement is a defined benefit plan which is
designed to provide a floor or minimum benefit. The normal retirement benefit paya
ble under the defined benefit plan is offset by the benefit provided under a separate,
but related profit sharing plan. Under the floor plan arrangement, if the profit
sharing plan fails to provide an amount of retirement benefit equal to the floor level
promised under the defined benefit plan, the defined benefit pension plan will make
up the difference. On the other hand, if the profit sharing provides a normal retire
ment benefit in excess of the floor level, all benefits will be provided under the
profit sharing plan. See Rev. Rul. 259, 1976-2 C.B. Ill. The Department of Labor
was asked to decide whether a floor plan arrangement is one or two plans. If viewed
as a single plan, the profit sharing component could cease contributions at normal re
tirement date. If viewed as two plans, two differing results are possible.
One possibility is that the defined benefit plan be viewed as a supplemental
plan in which case the profit sharing plan could cease contributions at normal retire
ment date. The other possibility and the result imposed by the literal meaning of the
Interpretative Bulletin, is that the floor plan arrangement does constitute two plans,
and the profit sharing plan, as a defined contribution plan covering the same em
ployees as a defined benefit plan, is supplemental with the result that contributions
to the profit sharing plan must continue after normal retirement date.
The Department of Labor also refused to indicate how target benefit plans
should be treated under the Interpretative Bulletin. The target benefit plan is a hy
brid defined benefit/defined contribution plan. Under ERISA, a target benefit plan is
a defined contribution plan, but it is given defined benefit plan treatment for pur
poses of the maximum age exclusion. See I.R.C. §§ 41O(a)(2), 414(i), 415(c); Rev. Rul.
464, 1976-2 C.B. 115. A target benefit plan obligates an employer to make a level
contribution each year on behalf of an employee necessary to provide an assumed or
target benefit at normal retirement date. The contributions are allocated to an indi
vidual account for each employee. If the earnings of the plan are above the assumed
investment rate made in calculating the contribution, the participant will receive a
benefit at normal retirement in excess of the target benefit. On the other hand, if the
actual rate of return to the plan is less than the assumed rate of return, the partici
pant will receive a retirement benefit which is less than the target benefit. Historic
ally, the informal position of the IRS National Office has been that a target benefit
plan is a defined contribution plan for purposes of determining whether prohibited
discrimination in favor of officers, shareholders or highly compensated employees has
occurred. As a result of this position, the IRS National Office has required that con
tributions to a target benefit plan cease at normal retirement date. The preamble to
the Interpretative Bulletin states that defined contribution plan is synonymous with
individual account plan. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,655 (1979). Since a target benefit
plan is an individual account plan, one may assume that the. Interpretative Bulletin
requires supplemental target benefit plans to continue contributions after normal re
tirement date. Thus, there appears to be a conflict in policy between the Interpreta
tive Bulletin and the informal position of the Internal Revenue Service with regard
to the continuation of contributions after normal retirement date under target benefit
plans.
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The Interpretative Bulletin also requires that investment gains
and losses and employee termination forfeitures be available on the
same basis to employees after normal retirement age as they are
available to younger employees. This is true whether or not the
defined contribution plan is supplemental. 231 Thus, it is improper
to freeze the value of the participant's individual account as of his
or her normal retirement age. The account must continue to be
credited with investment gains and losses. In the case of a profit
sharing plan, the account must be credited with any employee ter
mination forfeitures which are reallocated to the remaining partici
pants.
The EEOC is contemplating requiring all defined contribution
plans to continue contributions after an employee reaches normal
retirement age. 232 While conflicting with the legislative history, 233
requiring continued contributions would result in a less drastic
restructuring of existing plans than would a requirement for contin
ued accruals in defined benefit plans. In fact, many defined contri
bution plans already continue contributions after normal retirement
age. 234 Furthermore, while the cessation of benefit accruals in a
defined benefit plan can be justified as avoiding an employer cost
which is directly related to age, no similar age related justification
exists for a defined contribution plan. In' the typical defined contri
bution plan, the contribution is a percentage of the participant's
salary; the participant's age is immaterial.
Under ERISA, there is some dispute as to whether contribu
tions may cease at normal retirement age if a participant continues
to work. The parallel minimum participation standards of ERISA
and the Internal Revenue Code can be interpreted as requiring
231. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(I)(iv)(B)(2) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,655-56
(1979) (preamble to Interpretative Bulletin).
232. Leach's speech, supra note 7, although advocating modification of the de
fined benefit rules also appears to propose revision of the defined contribution rules.
Thus, Leach urged "[W]ould it not be more equitable to carry forward the 'equal
cost' principle and simply require contributions, or credit all post-normal retirement
service for purposes of benefit accrual." (emphasis added). The EEOC staff has more
clearly indicated its intent to revise the defined contribution rules. See, e.g.,
Huffman, supra note 7, at 1.
233. See note 224 supra.
234. For example, financial institutions may offer to employers "master" and
"prototype" plans which have been approved as to form by the IRS Na
tional Office. See Rev. Proc. 8, 1972-1 C.B. 716. The IRS National Office insists
that master and prototype money purchase pension plans and profit sharing plans
continue contributions after normal retirement date. See IRS Form M-0161 (10177)
(Defined Contribution, Corporate Listing of Required Modifications Document Pro
visions 22 & 23).
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continued contributions. Specifically, the minimum participation stan
dards contain an express exclusion from participation for persons
hired within five years of normal retirement age in a defined bene
fit or target benefit plan. There is no exclusion for participation
from defined contribution plans. 235 Arguably, the failure to exclude
employees from participation requires continued accruals. If this
position is correct, then the Interpretative Bulletin's rule for
nonsupplemental plans contravenes ERISA.
A counterargument, however, is that participation is not syn
onymous with benefit accrual. 236 While an employee is entitled
after normal retirement age to continue as a participant, he or she
may not be entitled to receive employer contributions. 237 As a par
ticipant, his or her account would continue to share in investment
and experience gains and losses. Furthermore, the participant
would be entitled to exercise rights under title I of ERISA: To ex
amine plan documents, to receive disclosure materials and to sue
in federal courts.
3. Involuntary Retirement
Retirement plans have customarily required involuntary retire
ment when an employee reaches the plan's normal retirement age.
Section 4(£)(2) of the ADEA, however, now prohibits involuntary
retirement because of age. Specifically, section 4(£)(2) states: "[N]o
such seniority system or employee benefit plan shall require or
permit the involuntary retirement of any individual ... because of
the age of such individual. "238
Many retirement plans still contain normal retirement provi
sions which permit or require involuntary retirement of an em
ployee at normal retirement age, usually at 65. Many plans also
235. ERISA § 202(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(2) (1976); l.R.C. § 41O(A)(2); Treas.
Reg. § 1.401(a)-4 (1979).
236. ERISA § 204, 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 2530.204-1-.204-3;
l.R.C. § 411(a)(7), (b); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(b)-1(a) (1979). Prior to ERISA, the Internal
Revenue Service permitted employer contributions to cease at normal retirement age
under a money purchase pension plan. See Rev. Rul. 73-448, 1973-2 C.B. 136. At the
same time the Internal Revenue Service also permitted employer contributions to
continue after normal retirement age under a profit-sharing plan. See Rev. Rul.
69-414, 1969-2 C.B. 59; See also IRS Publ. 778 (2172) (Guidelines for Qualification of
Pension, Profit-Sharing and Stock Bonus Plans, Part 5(g)).
237. How convincing is it to hire an employee who is older than the normal re
tirement age, classify him as a participant, but credit his individual account with no
contributions or reallocated forfeitures?
238. 29 U.S.C.A. § 603(f)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amending 29 U.S.C. §
623(f)(2) (1976)).
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contain deferred retirement provisions which permit continued em
ployment after normal retirement age only with employer consent.
Such provisions must be amended.
Incorporating employment practices into the provisions of em
ployee benefit plans has been commonplace. This practice, how
ever, no longer seems desirable. While the commencement of
retirement benefits will often coincide with termination of employ
ment, the entitlement to retirement benefits can no longer be used
to determine employment statuS. 239 In light of the 1978 amend
ments, separate treatment of retirement benefits and personnel
practices seems preferable. While a plan's normal retirement age
can no longer be the employer's age of mandatory retirement, nor
mal retirement age continues to be needed for purposes of
determining retirement benefits. 240 Consequently, plan provisions
must continue to define normal retirement age,241 but should avoid
any suggestion that reaching normal retirement age requires a ter
mination of employment.
The legislative history of the 1978 amendments clearly permits
an employer to select a normal retirement age of less than 70. 242
One unresolved issue, however, is whether an employer may
choose an unusually low normal retirement age. Under ERISA and
the Internal Revenue Code, it is permissible for an employer to se
lect a normal retirement age earlier than 65. 243 There are legiti
mate reasons other than costs for lowering the normal retirement
239. See 44 Fed. Reg. 68,860, 68,862 (1979) (proposed EEOC interpretation) (to
be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1635.9).
240. Normal retirement age is the time in which definitely determinable bene
fits under a qualified pension plan became fixed and payable, the participant is
100% vested in his accrued benefit. I.R.C. § 411(a). Under the 133 1(3% and the frac
tional rules for accrued benefits, accruals in qualified defined benefit plans cease at
normal retirement age. I.R.C. § 411(b)(I)(B), (C); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(b)(2)(ii)(E),
.4U(b)(3)(ii)(C) (1979). A participant's right to elect out of a qualified joint and sur
vivor annuity and into an early survivor annuity is measured from normal retire
ment age. I.R.C. § 401(a)(11)(B), (C); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)11(a)(I)(i), -11(b)(5), and
-11(c)(I)(2) (1979). Finally, a participant must be permitted to retire and to com
mence to receive benefits within 60 days after the end of the plan year in which he
reaches normal retirement age. I.R.C. § 401(a)(14)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-14(a)(l)
(1979).
241. I.R.C. § 411(a)(8); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-7(b) (1979).
242. S. REP., supra note 112, at 5; Elisburg letter, supra note 190.
243. Rev. Rul. 120, 1978-1 C.B. 117 (a plan may specify any age that is less
than 65 as the normal retirement age). But see Rev. Rul. 331, 1978-2 C.B. 158,
which indicates that an early normal retirement age in a defined benefit plan which
would otherwise increase the employer's deductible contribution will have to be ig
nored for funding purposes if employees do not, in fact, retire at the age specified.

436

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:379

age. 244 Lowering the normal retirement age, however, results in
lower benefit costs, at the expense of older workers. This happens
because employer contributions and benefit accruals can stop after
normal retirement age. The Department of Labor noted in the pre
amble to its proposed Interpretative Bulletin that it would "scruti
nize carefully as a potential subterfuge" any unusually low normal
retirement age. 245 The statement was deleted without comment in
the final version.
Since normal retirement age can no longer be used to termi
nate older employees, it is imperative for employers to develop
satisfactory performance appraisal systems. While it is true that
mandatory retirement at normal retirement age forces some com
petent employees out of work, it is also true that mandatory retire
ment provided a graceful means of forcing out older employees
who were no longer competent. 246 Perhaps the most serious prob
244. A lower normal retirement age will increase the employer's deductible
contribution to a defined benefit plan. But see Rev. Rul. 78-331, 1978-2 C.B. 158.
A lower normal retirement age can also increase the value of the benefit paid to
a highly compensated employee under a defined benefit plan. l.R.C. § 415(b)(1) es
tablishes a maximum annual benefit payable to any participant under a defined ben
efit plan of the lesser of: (i) 100% of the participant's average compensation in his
high three consecutive years of employment while he was an active participant, or
(ii) $75,000 (adjusted each year for cost of living increases, effective Jan. 1, 1980 to
$110,625. 3 PEN. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 'if 17,172 at 20,282 (IRS News Release 80-10,
Feb. 5, 1980)). I.R.C. § 415(b)(2)(C) requires a downward adjustment in the value of
the annual benefit where the benefit begins before age 55. See Rev. Rul. 75-481
§ 3.04, 1975-2 C.B. 188. The present value of a maximum annual benefit (i.e., a
single life annuity) commencing at age 55 is greater than the present value of a maxi
mum annual benefit commencing at age 65. Consequently, a normal retirement age
of 55 permits a larger one sum cash distribution option than a normal retirement age
of 65. See Burrows, Maximum Benefits and Contributions in Small Corporate Re
tirement Plans Without Violating Section 415, 5 J. PENS. PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 311,
323-24 (1979).
245. 43 Fed. Reg. 43,264, 43,267 (1978).
246.. 29 C.F.R. §§ 103(f), 860.104(b) (1968) (Department of Labor regulations);
44 Fed. Reg. 68,858, 68,861 (1979) (proposed EEOC regulation) (to be codified in 29
C.F.R. § 1625.7). The majority of courts have permitted a discharge in connection
with a reduction in force based upon evaluation of performance and ability as com
pared to other employees to perform the work remaining. Bishop v. Jelleff Assocs.,
398 F. Supp. 579 (D. D.C. 1974); Billingsley v. Service Technology Corp., 6 Fair
Empl. Prac. 404, 410 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Gill v. Union Carbide Corp., 368 F. Supp.
364, 366 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Stringfellow v. Monsanto Co., 320 F. Supp. 1175,
1181-82 (W.D. Ark. 1970). Similarly a discharge of an older employee can be based
upon inadequate performance. Surrissi v. Con wed Corp., 510 F.2d 1088, 1090 (8th
Cir. 1975); Cowlishaw v. Armstong Rubber Co., 450 F. Supp. 148 (E.D.N.)' 1978);
Bittar v. Air Canada, 10 Fair Empl. Prac. 1136, 1137 (S.D. Fla. 1974), affd, 512 F.2d
582 (5th Cir. 1975); Bishop v. Jelleff Assocs., 398 F. Supp. 579, 586-88 (D.D.C.
1974); Brennan v. Reynolds Co., 367 F. Supp. 440, 444 (N.D. Ill. 1973). Periodic
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lem for employers is to establish workable criteria to fire older em
ployees who are no longer physically or mentally capable of doing
their jobs. 247
4. Involuntary Retirement-Exception for Executive
and High Policymaking Employees
Although the 1978 amendments generally prohibit mandatory
retirement of employees prior to age 70, there is an exception
which permits employers to force individuals employed in a bona
fide executive or high policymaking position to retire at age 65. 248
In order to qualify for the exemption, an employee must be: (1)
Age 65 or older; (2) employed in a bona fide executive or high
policymaking position for the two year period immediately before
retirement; and (3) entitled to an immediate nonforfeitable annual
retirement benefit from a pension, profit-sharing, savings or de
ferred compensation plan or any combination of such plans of the
employer which equals in the aggregate $27,000, exclusive of bene
fit amounts attributable to employee contributions and to rollover
contributions. If necessary, the annual retirement benefit payable
must be adjusted to equal a straight life annuity with no ancillary
benefits.
The EEOC has issued a final Interpretation249 concerning the
exception for certain executive and high policymaking employees
which closely follows an earlier Department of Labor proposal. 250
This Interpretation provides that the exemption is to be construed
narrowly. The burden is on the employer to demonstrate that each
element required to satisfy the exemption is met. 251

performance appraisals appear to be the most satisfactory way of monitoring em
ployee performance.
247. The employer's problem is to develop a performance appraisal system
which is not vulnerable to a charge that it constitutes or perpetuates discrimination.
See generally Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (title VII cases);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1970); McGregor, An Uneasy Look at Per
formance Appraisal, 50 HARV. Bus. REV. 133 (1972); Gery, Minimizing Bias in Ap
praisal and Promotion 117, 4 EEO TODAY (1977); Brown, Passed Over Executives are
Suing Their Firms to Demand Promotion, Wall St. J., April 29, 1977 at 1, col.l; B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMEl'o.'T DISCRIMINATION LAW 132-81 (1976).
248. ADEA § 12(c)(I), 29 U.S.C.A. § 631(c)(l) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
249. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,79&-97 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R.
§§ 1627.17, 1625.12) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation).
250. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,148-52 (1978) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. §§ 850.17,
860.97).
251. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,800 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R.
§ 1625. 12(b)).
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The employee may be forced to retire as early as age 65 but
only if he was a bona fide executive or high policymaking employee
for the entire two-year period prior to retirement. The two-year
requirement prevents an employer from placing an employee in
such a position just before age 65 in order to force the employee to
retire. 252
In order for an employee to qualify as a bona fide executive,
the employer must first establish that the employee meets the test
for a bona fide executive under the overtime pay provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act. 253 The Fair Labor Standards Act test
which is set forth in implementing regulations 254 provides that a
bona fide executive is any employee: (1) Whose primary duty, in
volving 50% or more of his or her time, consists of the manage
ment of a business or a recognized department or subdivision
thereof; (2) who customarily and regularly directs the work of two
or more employees; (3) who has the authority to hire or to fire
other employees, or whose suggestions concerning hiring, firing,
promotion or other changes in employment status are given partic
ular weight; (4) who customarily and regularly exercises discretion
ary powers; (5) who does not devote more than 20% of his or her
hours of work in the work week to activities which are not directly
and closely related to the performance of work described in one
through four above;255 (6) who is compensated for his or her serv
ices on a salary basis at a rate of not less than $155 per week.
In addition to satisfying the Fair Labor Standards Act for a
bona fide executive test, the employer also must demonstrate that
the employee meets further criteria specified in the Conference
Committee Report.256 The EEOC Interpretation emphasizes that
the exemption does not apply to "middle management" employees
but only to a "very few top level employees who exercise substan
tial executive authority over a significant number of employees and
a large volume of business."257 Similarly, the Conference Report
252. H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1978).
253. Id. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,800 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R.
§ 1625.12(d)(I)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation).
254. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(l) (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 541.1 (1979).
255. This fifth condition is not applicable to an employee who is in sole charge
of an independent establishment or a physically separate branch establishment or
who owns at least 20% interest in an enterprise in which he is employed. 29 C.F.R.
§§ 541.113, .114 (1979).
256. H.R. REP., supra note 252.
257. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,800 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R.
§ 1625.12(d)(2)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation).
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indicated that the exemption should not be as expansively inter
preted as the exemption under the Fair Labor Standards Act and
should be applied only to "certain high level executives. "258 The
EEOC Interpretation quotes from the Conference Report state
ment259 suggesting that the following general categories of employ
ees constitute bona fide executives under the ADEA: (1) The head
of a significant and substantial local or regional operation of a cor
poration;26o (2) individuals in the higher levels of a corporate
organizational structure who possess comparable or greater levels
of responsibility than those employees described in (1) above; (3)
the head of a major department or division located at corporate or
regional headquarters; and (4) in larger organizations, the immedi
ate subordinates of executives described in (3) above, if they exer
cise responsibility, comparable to or greater than that possessed by
those executives described in (1) above.
The high policymaking exemption is distinct from the bona
fide executive exemption. 261 The EEOC Interpretation relies on
the Conference Report to establish the meaning of high policy
making position. In fact, the Conference Report is directly quoted
in the EEOC Interpretation. The legislative history of the 1978
amendments indicates that the high policymaking exemption is
available for individuals who have little or no line responsibility,
have a significant role in the development of a corporate policy,
. and actively recommend implementation of such policy to top exec
utive offices. 262
The Conference Report cites a chief economist or chief re
search scientist of a corporation as an example of an individual who
would qualify for the exemption. The Conference Report notes,
however, that employees who provide staff support to such individ
uals would not qualify. 263
In addition to being a bona fide executive or high policy
making employee, to qualify under the exemption the employee
must be fully vested in benefits of at least $27,000 calculated as a
258. H.R. REP., supra note 252.
259. Id.
260. Although the Conference Report speaks in terms of employees of "corpo
rations," it is clear that corporation was intended to be synonymous with any busi
ness enterprise. Id. See 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,800 (1979) (to be codified in 29
C.F.R. § 1625.12(d)(2)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation).
261. H.R. REP., supra note 252, at 9-10. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,800 (1979) (to
be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1625.12(e)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation).
262. Id.
263. Id.
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straight life annuity, payable immediately. In addition, the benefits
must be received from plans of the employer who f~tiresthe em
ployee. Specifically, the EEOC Interpretation takes the position
that to be exempted, an employee must have the option of
receiving during each year of his or her lifetime following retire
ment at least $27,000 per year not including amounts attributable
to social security, rollover contributions, and contributions of pri
or employers.264 Amounts attributable to employee contributions
which must be excluded are to be determined in accordance with
Internal Revenue Service regulations promulgated under Code sec
tion 411(c).265 These regulations relate to the allocation of accrued
benefits between employer and employee contributions. No spe
cific method is suggested to determine amounts attributable to so
cial security.266 Only retirement income of the employer desiring
to force the employee to retire can be considered. Since most em
ployers have plans of their own, this rule presents no problem.
Some employers, however, participate in a plan with a number of
other employers. This makes determination of the source of the re
tirement benefit difficult. If the benefits attributable to prior em
ployers cannot be readily determined, the EEOC Interpretation
requires the following formula to be used: Current employers bene
fits equal total benefits received less the benefit the ,employee
would have received had the employee never worked for the cur
rent employer.267 Retirement benefits, however, provided by af
filiated employers satisfying the controlled group requirement of
Code section 414(b) and (c) may be considered",Rollover contribu
-~
tions are specifically excluded. 268
264. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,797 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1627.17)
(EEOC § 12(c) interpretation).
265. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,798 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R.
§ 1627.17(e)(2)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation). See Treas. Reg. § 1.411(c)-1 (1979).
266. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,798 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R.
§ 1627.17(e)(1)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation). See Rev. Rul. 71-446, 1971-2 C.B.
187; Rev. Rul. 72-276, 1972-1 C.B. Ill; Announcement 72-7, I.R.B. 1972-4, at 20;
Rev. Rul. 72-492, 1972-2 C.B. 222; Rev. Rul. 78-92, 1978-1 C.B. 118 for Internal Rev
enue Service rules on calculating the limits to which Social Security can be inte
grated with a qualified retirement plan.
267. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,798 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. §1627. 17
(e)(3)(ii)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation).
268. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,798 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1627.17
(e)(4)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation). A rollover contribution is a nontaxable transfer
of retirement plan assets from one qualified plan to another qualified plan either di
rectly or indirectly through the intermediary of an individual retirement account or
annuity (IRA). See I.R:C. §§ 402(a)(5), 403(a)(4), 408(d)(3), 409(b)(3)(C); 45 Fed. Reg.
57-54-80 (1980) (prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.402(a)-3, 1.403(a)-3, 1.408-1(b)(2)).
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The $27,000 per year requirement is considered met if the
employee has the option of receiving upon retirement a lump sum
benefit with which it is possible to purchase a single life annuity
with no ancillary benefits yielding at least $27,000 per year. 269 The
$27,000 per year requirement is also met when the aggregate value
of the employee's retirement benefits as of the employee's retire
ment date with respect to payments to be made with his life ex
pectancy equals $27,000 per year as a single life annuity using
reasonable actuarial assumptions. 27o Thus, under the EEOC Inter
pretation, an employee who is entitled to receive an annual
lifetime retirement benefit of less than $27,000 per year with ancil
lary benefits, and thus, actuarially worth $27,000 or more, will
qualify for the exemption although the employee does not have the
right to receive retirement benefits in a form equal to $27,000 per
year or more. This represents a liberalization over the Department
of Labor's proposal. That proposal provided that no employee who
is required to receive less than $27,000 per year during his or her
lifetime in retirement because of other benefits being provided
only after death will fall within the exemption. 271 The Department
of Labor's proposal would have created problems for plans which
provide only one form of retirement benefit which is not a single
life annuity. For example, a defined benefit plan which provides
the only form of retirement benefit is a qualified joint and survivor
annuity. A retirement benefit payable during the joint lives of the
employee and the spouse of $24,000 per year and a survivor annu
ity payable to the spouse of $12,000 a year may be equal actuarially
to a single life annuity of more than $27,000. It would not have
qualified for the exemption under the Department of Labor's pro
posal, however, because the employee did not have the option to
receive the benefits in the form of a $27,000 per year single life an
nuity.
The $27,000 amount is a static figure not subject to cost
of living increases. This approach is somewhat surprising because
ERISA, in several key provisions, establishes dollar limitations for
pension benefits. In recognition of our inflationary economy, how
269. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,797 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R.
§ 1627.17(c)(2)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation).
270. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,797-98 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1627,
17(c)(4)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation; 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,794 (preamble to In
terpretative Bulletin).
271. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,148, 58,149 (1978) (preamble comment to Proposed Inter
pretative Bulletin) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 850. 17(c)).
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ever, ERISA subjects those dollar amounts to cost of living adjust
ments. 272 In time, the $27,000 limit will reach more employees
than it does presently. Thus, the effect of inflation will make the
bona fide executive and high policymaking exemptions the critical
requirements rather than the dollar limitation.
In a defined contribution plan, the value of the individual's re
tirement benefit may fluctuate depending upon the investment ex
perience of the plan. 273 Fluctuations in retirement income may
make it difficult for personnel managers to make long range deter
minations as to whether an individual will be eligible for forced re
tirement at age 65.
Employers will also have problems with plans which permit
employees to make withdrawals of employer provided benefits
while actively employed. The preamble to the EEOC Interpreta
tion notes that there is nothing to prevent an active employee from
withdrawing employer contributions from a plan in order to avoid
receiving a $27,000 retirement benefit. 274 The EEOC Interpreta
tion also notes that an employer is not entitled to supplement re
tirement benefits in order to reach the $27,000 limit. 275
The only retirement benefits which may be counted towards
the $27,000 annual test are those derived from a pension, profit
sharing, savings or deferred compensation program or any combi
nation of such programs. The EEOC Interpretation specifically in
cludes stock bonus, thrift plans, simplified employee pension plans
and certain nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements. 276
The Interpretation also suggests that more exotic types of retire
ment plans may be included. 277 Severance pay plans, however, ap
pear to be excluded. 278
272. See, e.g., l.R.C. § 415(d), adjusting dollar limits for the maximum contribu
tions and benefits permitted under qualified retirement plans and ERISA § 4022(b)(3)
29 U.S.C. § 1,322(b)(3) (1976) establishing a maximum federally guaranteed qualified
defined benefit plan benefit amount adjusted in accordance with Social Security in
creases.
273. See ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1976); l.R.C. § 414(i) (defining
defined contribution plans).
274. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,794 (1979).
275. ld.
276. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,798,66,801 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. §§
1627.I7(d), 1625, 12(J)(2)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation).
277. ld. Are tax sheltered annuities benefits under l.R.C. § 403(b) funded by
salary reduction agreements or agreements to forgo a salary increase considered to
be employer provided benefits?
278. See 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,794 (1979) (preamble comments to EEOC
§ 12(c) interpretation). A severance pay plan provides additional benefits out of
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The $27,000 per year benefit must be an immediate nonfor
feitable benefit payable at the time of compulsory retirement. The
EEOC Interpretation considers the nonforfeitable annual retire
ment benefit to be immediate within the meaning of ADEA's sec
tion 12(c) only if the first payment of plan benefits is made within
60 days after the date of compulsory retirement. 279 This sixty day
rule is more stringent than the ERISA requirement that benefits
must c~mmence no later than 60 days after the end of the plan
year in which the employee retires. 280
The EEOC Interpretation considers the annual retirement
benefit of a qualified retirement plan to be nonforfeitable if
the employee is 100% vested. 281 The nonforfeitable exceptions of
ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code may be taken into ac
count. 282 For example, benefits may be discontinued at death283
and suspended during periods of reemployment. 284 Nonqualified
deferred compensation plans are separately considered. 285 The pre
amble to the EEOC Interpretation indicates that prior to retire
ment such plans may provide for the forfeiture of benefits. 286 Tax
considerations dictate this interpretation. Nonforfeitable benefits
may result in constructive receipt of income and loss of tax
deferral. So long as employee's rights to benefits are forfeitable,
there is not constructive receipt. 287 Thus, forfeitability of benefits

the employer's general assets to increase retirement benefits. See 29 C.F.R. §
2510.3-2(b) (1979) (defining severance pay plan for purposes of title I of ERISA).
279. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,796 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1625.12
(i)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation).
280. ERISA § 206(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(a) (1976); I.R.C. § 401(a)(14); Treas. Reg. §
1.401(a)-14 (1979).
281. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,800 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R.
§ 1625.12(k)(I)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation).
282. ld. See ERISA § 203(a)(3)-(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3)-(b) (1976); I.R.C.
§ 41l(a)(3), (4); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.41l(a)-4,-5 (1977).
283. ERISA § 203(a)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3)(A) (1976); I.R.C. § 41l(a)
(3)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.41l(a)-4(b)(1) (1977).
284. ERISA § 203(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3)(B) (1976); I.R.C. § 411(a)
(3)(B); 43 Fed. Reg. 59,098 (1978) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 2530.203-3).
285. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,801 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R.
§ 1625.12(K)(I)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation).
286. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,796-97 (1979).
287. An interest in a funded deferred compensation plan is not currently taxed
if it is transferrable or is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. I.R.C. § 83(a)
(1976). An interest in an unfunded deferred compensation plan is not currently taxed
if the employees' rights are forfeitable. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1, -2 (1978). An interest in
an unfunded deferred compensation plan, however, is still not taxed currently even if
the employees' rights are nonforfeitable if: (1) The agreement is entered into before
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prior to retirement is desirable for tax reasons. After retirement,
the EEOC Interpretation requires benefits to be nonforfeitable.
Many nonqualified deferred compensation plans currently provide
for loss of benefits to a retiree, if the retiree engages in litigation
against the employer or obtains employment with a competitor of
the employer. Such plans have forfeitable retirement benefits and
cannot be considered when calculating the value of the employee's
retirement benefits. 288 Finally, the EEOC Interpretation provides
that a benefit is nonforfeitable only if there is a reasonable expecta
tion that the plan will be able to meet its obligations. 289
Ironically, section 12(c) of the ADEA may actually discourage
the hiring of older executives because, if they do not work out, the
employer is not entitled to include pensions from a prior employer
to retire involuntarily the employee prior to age 70. Of course, the
ADEA permits firing of an older employee for unsatisfactory per
formance. Traditionally, however, employers have preferred to per
mit older employees who have unsatisfactory performance to retire.
The EEOC Interpretation also permits executive or high pol
icymaking employees who fall within the exemption to be offered a
lesser position or a part-time position. 29o The rationale for this in-

the compensation is earned, and (2) the employer's promise to pay is not secured in
any way. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174; Rev. Rul. 70-435, 1970-2 C.B. 100. See
also Commissioner v. Olmstead Inc. Life Agency, 304 F.2d 16, 16-21 (8th Cir. 1962)
(discussing Commissioner v. Oates, 18 T.C. 570, afI'd, 207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir.
1953)); Robinson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 20, 36 (1965) (citing Veit v. Commis
sioner, 8 T.C. 809 (1947)); Basila v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 111 (1961); Gann v. Com
missioner, 31 T.C. 211 (1958). Special limits apply to state nonqualified deferred
compensation plans. I.R.C. § 457 (1978). Deferred Compensation plans entered into
with § 501(c) tax exempt organizations .may face special problems. See 43 Fed. Reg.
4,638 (1978) (proposed regulation at Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16).
288. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791,66,797 (1979) (preamble to EEOC § 12(c) interpreta
tion).
289. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1625, 12(K)(2))
(EEOC § 12(c) interpretation). The proposed Department of Labor regulation re
quired the plan to be "sufficiently funded" to meet its obligations. 43 Fed. Reg.
58,152 (1978) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 860.97(K)(2)). This was omitted in the
EEOC Interpretation because a "funding" requirement could eliminate all unfunded
deferred compensation.arrangements from the exemption. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791 (1979)
(preamble to EEOC § 12(c) interpretation). In addition, qualified defined benefit
plan benefits which are restricted under the early termination rule are not consid
ered forfeitable. Treas. Reg. § 1. 401-4(c), T.D.6675. The early termination rule re
stricts payments in excess of a certain amount for the 25 highest paid employees for
the first ten years after the plan is established or amended, if the plan is not cur
rently funded or if the plan is terminated within the ten year period. Id.
290. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1625.12(c))
(EEOC § 12(c) interpretation).
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terpretation of section 12(c) is that an employer who is able to force
an employee to retire should also be able to offer the employee a
position of lesser status or, in the case of a full-time employee, a
part-time position. 291 The Interpretation, however, indicates that
the employer loses the option of forcing an employee to retire
prior to age 70, if the employer offers the employee a position of
lesser status or a part-time position which is not a bona fide execu
tive or high policymaking position. 292

V.

NEED TO REVIEW EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PRACTICES Now

The EEOC has yet to publish its employee benefit plan
guidelines. Therefore, employers and their attorneys should begin
a comprehensive review of their retirement practices and their em
ployee benefit plans. They should take steps to insure that their
plans conform to the ADEA as amended. The preamble to the De
partment of Labor's Interpretative Bulletin notes that its rules are
"effective immediately," which means as of May 25, 1979. 293 The
Interpretative Bulletin also notes that for the period of time be
tween January 1, 1979, when the law became effective as to most
employers, and May 25, 1979, when the Interpretative Bulletin was
published, employers who relied in good faith on the older Depart
ment of Labor's Interpretative Bulletin or an opinion letter of the
Wage and Hour Administrator will not be held liable for failure to
comply with the new rules. 294 The Interpretative Bulletin notes,
however, that some benefit practices "could never be proved to
have been in good faith" conforming with the older interpretation.
One such practice would be a total benefit cut off on the basis of
age for employees between ages 40 and 65 and, since January
1979, for employees between ages 40 and 70. 295
After May 25, 1979, the Department of Labor notes that prob
lems in achieving prompt compliance may be considered in the
conciliation of individual cases. The Department of Labor and the
EEOC, however, will evaluate whether prompt compliance "could
feasibly be achieved" through existing insurance products or partial
self insurance. 296 The EEOC has noted that the Department of
291. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,795-96 (1979) (preamble to EEOC § 12(c) interpre
tation).
292. ld.
293. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,657 (1979).
294. ld.
295. ld.
296. ld. The phrase "partial self insurance" is troublesome. The phrase could
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Labor's Interpretative Bulletins may be relied upon until it pub
lishes its own guidelines. 297
Conformance with the ADEA amendments, recently enacted
state laws, and federal regulatory interpretations will require signif
icant changes in many employee benefit plans and especially in
welfare benefit plans. A number of key policy decisions should be
addressed by employers. The employer should initially make a ba
sic business decision either to encourage, discourage or maintain a
position of neutrality with respect to the retention of older employ
ees. All employers, and especially those employers who wish to
discourage the continued employment of older workers to the ex
tent permitted by law, should take steps to establish a formal per
formance appraisal program in order to monitor the quality of work
of all its employees. Unless an employee is a bona fide executive or
high policymaking employee, the only way to terminate employee
services prior to age 70 is by demonstrating unsatisfactory per
formance. Given heightened awareness among employees of the
ADEA, employers must be able to produce tangible evidence of
unsatisfactory employment of an older worker in order to avoid a
discrimination action.
Employers should examine current retirement patterns of
their employees to determine how many employees are likely to
elect to defer retirement after age 65. Many personnel specialists
believe that more workers will elect to defer retirement in the fu
ture. The employer should establish a separate statement of retire
ment policy, including a statement of whether the employer
intends to use the exception for bona fide executive and high
policymaking employees. Retirement plan benefits and welfare
plan benefits for older workers should be reviewed carefully to de
termine whether the plans provide benefits consistent with the em
ployer's philosophy of encouraging or discouraging continued em
ployment after age 65.
The cost implications of any employee benefit plan options for
present and future employees also should be reviewed. The em
ployer should consider possible exposure to litigation if employee
benefit plan practices depart from the requirements of the Inter
pretative Bulletin. To the extent that amendments to the existing
be interpreted to permit the EEOC to claim that prompt compliance could "feasibly
be achieved" in any insured employee benefit plan by having the employer pay ad
ditional benefits not provided by or available through insurance companies out of its
general assets.
297. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,974 (1979).
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benefit plans are necessary, employers should amend plan docu
ments and the summary plan descriptions. They should also make
any other changes necessary to comply with the reporting and dis
closure requirements of ERISA. If a qualified pension plan must be
amended, the plan should be filed for review with the Internal
Revenue Service. Once the changes in the employee benefit pro
grams are formalized, the changes should be communicated to em
ployees. 298 Employers may wish to establish pre-retirement coun
seling programs to provide employees with an informal choice
about retirement at various ages. 299
Given the growing numbers and political power of older Amer
icans,300 employers can expect additional demands concerning em
ployee rights. Consideration has already been given to eliminating
compulsory retirement. Similar consideration has been given to
forbidding the cessation of benefit accruals at normal retirement
age in defined benefit pension plans. Employers may wish to antic
ipate these trends and plan accordingly.

298. See text accompanying notes 55-64 supra.
299. See, e.g., Facing Up to Retirement; More Companies Help Ease the Way,
N.Y. Times, August 20, 1979, at C19, col. 1.
300. The 65 and over population in the United States was 10.7% in 1976.
AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, PENSION FACTS 1978-197940-45 (1979). It
is projected to be 12.7% in 2010 and 18.3% in 2030. Id.

APPENDIX
STATE AGE DISCRIMINAnON LAWS

Does law
apply to
private

Minimum
number of
employees
before law
applies

industry

Jurisdiction
,
United States

Law
29 U,S,C. §§ 621·634 (1976).
29 C.F.R. § 850, § 860.120 (1979),

employers?
Yes

25 (by
amendment)

Protected
age group
40 to 65

"'"'""

00

Exception to
permit involun
tary retirement
at an earlier
age for participants in
pension benefit
plans

Exception to
permit forced
retirement of
highly paid
employees receiving sub
stantial retirement benefits

No, see 43 Fed.
Reg. 43,269
(1978) (to be
codified in 29
C.F.R. § 860.120)
(Proposed Depart
ment of Labor's
Interpretative
Bulletin)

Yes, $27,000/yr.

~
t>l
en

;:;;
~
<:

t>l

~

t>l

<:

Alaska

18 ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (1962).

Yes

No minimum

Employees of
all ages

No

No

()

California

CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420.1 (Deering
SuPp. 1979).

Yes

5

From 40 on,

No

Yes, $27,OOO/yr,

&:<:

no upper

Jimit
Colorado

COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8·2·116, -117
(I974).

Yes

No minimum

18 to 60

No -

No

Connecticut

CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 31·122, -126
( 1979).

Yes

3

Employees of
all ages

Yes, at age 70
(restricted to state
and municipal
employees and
pu blic school
teachers)

Yes, $27\OOO/yr.

&:
~

~

-<:
t>l

~

Delaware

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 710,711 (a),
(h) & (i) (1975).

Yes

4

40 to 65

Yes

Yes, $27,OOO/yr.

District of
Columbia

D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6·2202, -2221,
-2222 (1973 & SuPp. V 1978).

Yes

No minimum

18 to 65

Yes

No

Florida

FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 13.211 (6). 13.261
(I)(a), (8)(b) (West Supp_ 1978),

Yes

15

Employees of
all ages

Yes

No

Ceorgia*

GA. CODE ANN. §§ 89-1701, 1707
(Cum. SuPp. 1979).

No

15

40 to 65

Yes

No

• repealed 7/1/80

tI

'<
~

""

e;,

-l
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APPENDIX-STATE AGE DISCRIMINATION LAWS (continued)

Jurisdiction

Law

Does law
apply to
private
industry
employers?

Minimum
number of
employees
before law
applies

Protected
age group

Exception to
pennit involun
tary retirement
at an earlier
age for par
ticipants in
pension benefit
plans

......

Exception to
permit forced
retirement of
highly paid
employees re
ceiving sub
stantial retire
ment benefits

Hawaii

HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 378·2(2), -2(7),
378-9(4) (1976).

Yes

I

16 to no
upper age
limit

Yes

No

Idaho

IDAHO CODE §§ 44-1601, -1602 (1977).

Yes

None

No lower
limit to
age 60

Yes

No

45 to no
upper age
limit

Yes

40 to 65

Yes

Illinois

Indiana
Iowa

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 881, 883
(Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1979).

Yes

IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-9-2-1, -II
(Burns 1974).

Yes

IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 601A.I, _6(2)-(5),
.13 (1975 & West Cum. Supp. 1979).

Yes

I

I

4

:.
No

ot'l
\:l
.....
en

18 (unless at
younger age
is lawfully an
adult) to no
upper age
limit, except
over 45 for
bona fide ap
prenticeship
employment
programs

Yes

No
No

C"l

:;x,

E::
.....
~
:::l

o

~

Kentucky

Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 344.030, _100,
.110(2)(e) (1977).

Yes

8

40 to 65

Yes

No

Louisiana

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:893 (West
1964) (law refers to firing & hiring

Yes

25

Under 50

Yes (if pension
covers periods
of service no
greater than 35
years and pays
out no less than
$45 a quarter)

No

and not compensation).

~

~

APPENDIX-STATE AGE DISCRIMINATION LAWS (continued)

Law

Jurisdiction
Mahle

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4571
4574 (1964 &: West SuPP. 1979).

Does law
apply to
private
industry
employers?
Yes

Minimum
number of
employees
before law
applies
None

Protected
age group
Minimum age

Exception to
permit involun
tary retirement
at an earlier
age for par
ticipants in
pension benefit
plans
Yes

Exception to
permit forced
retirement of
highly paid
employees re
ceiving sub
stantial retire
ment benefits
No

when minor

is lawfully
allowed to

~

~

upper limit
MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 15, 16
(Michie 1979).

Yes, except
private mem
bersbip club
(other than a
labor organi

15

No upper
or lower
limit

Yes

No

<:
t>l

~

t>l

<:

G')

zalion)

MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 151B,

Yes, except

§§ I, 4 (1971).

private non
profit clubs

Michigan

MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 37.2201,
.2211 (West SuPP. 1979).

Yes

4

None

Yes

No

Minnesota

MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181.81, 363.02,
03, (West Supp. 1979).

Yes

1

Mandatory

Yl'S

Yes, $27.000/yr.

Massachusetts

~

V>

work to no

Maryland

~

6

40 to 65

No

No

~

tI

retirement

at age 70
permitted.
differences

~
~

~

:st>l
~

in treabnent

allowed for
over 59 or

less than 21
Montana

Nebraska

MONT. REV. CoDES ANN. § 49-2-101(8).
-303 (1979).
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1001 to -1004
(1978).

Yes, except

1

None

No

No

25

40 to 65

Yes

No

for non-profit
corporations
Yes

~
~

c;,

-l
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APPENDIX-STATE AGE DISCRIMINATION LAWS (continued)

Jurisdiction
Nevada

Law
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 613.310, .330,
.350 (1973).

New Hampshire

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:2,
:3, :8 (1966 & Supp. 1979).

New Jersey

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West
Cum. SuPP. 1979).
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-2, -7, -9
(1978).

New Mexico

New York
North
Carolina
North
Dakota
Ohio
Oregon

Does law
apply to
private
industry
employers?
Yes, except

Indian tribes
and I.R.C.
§ 501(c) pri
vate clubs
Yes, except
no non-profit
organizations
Yes
Yes

Minimum
number of
employees
before law
applies

Protected
age group

Exception to
permit involun
tary retirement
at an earlier
age for par
ticipants in
pension benefit
plans

......

Exception to
permit forced
retirement of
highly paid
employees re
ceiving sub
stantial retire
ment benefits

15

None

Yes

No

6

None

Yes

No

1

None

No

No

4

None

No

No

~

)

~

N.Y. EXEC. LAw §§ 292, 296
(McKinney 1972 & West Supp_ 1979).
N.C. GEN. STAT_ § 143-422.2 (1978).

Yes

4

18 to 65

Yes, may be
forced to retire
age 65 if plan
qualifies under
ERISA
Yes

Yes

15

None

No

No

N.D. CEST. CoOF. § 34-01-17 (Supp.
1977).
OHIO REV. CoDE ANN. § 4101.17
(Page Supp. 1979).
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.010, .015,
.028, .030 (1977).

Yes

1

40 to 65

Yes

No

Yes

1

40 to 70

No

Yes, $27,OOO/yr.

Yes, except
certain indus
trial employers
and bona fide
church or sec
tarian religious
groups

1

18 to 65,
but compulsory
retirement of
employees
required by
law at an age
under 65 years
is not an
unlawful
employment
practice

Yes

No

\:l
....

n
'"
~

....s::
~

::l

o

<:

~
......

APPENDIX - STATE AGE DISCRIMINATION LAWS (continued)

t;
t<l

Jurisdiction
Pennsylvania
PUE'rto Rico

Law

Does law
apply to
private
industry
employers?

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 954, 955
(Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979).

Yes

P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, §§ 146,
151(1) (Supp. 1978).

Yes

Minimum
number of
E'mployees
before law
applies
4

Protected
age group
None

Exception to
permit involun
tary retirement
at an earlier
age for par
ticipants in
pension benefit
plan.
Yes

Exception to
permit forced
retirement of
highly paid
employees re
ceiving sub
stantial retire
ment benefits
No

No minimum

hfinimum
age when

No

No

lawfully
allowed to
work to 65
R.T. GEN. LAws § 28·6·1, ·5 (1968).

Yes, except

1

45 to 65

~

~
~

minor is

Rhode Island

~

en

~

Yes

No

private domes
tic service

~

()

~

South
Carolina

S.C. CODE § 1·13·80 (1976 & Cum.
Supp. 1979).

Yes

15

40 to 70

Yes

Yes, $27,OOO/yr.

Texas

TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
6252·)4 (Vernon 1970).

No

No minimum
number

21 to 65

No

No

Utah

UTAH CODE ANN. § 34·35·6(1) (a), (£),
§ 34·35·6(3) (Supp. 1979).

Yes

25

40 to no
upper limit

Yes

No

f;l

Washington

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.010,
.040, .180 (West Supp. 1978).

Yes

8

Noneo

No

No

~

West
Virginia

W. VA. CODE § 5·11·3, ·4, .8, ·9(a)
( 1979).

Yes

12

40 to 65

Yes

No

\Visconsin

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 1I1.32(3)(a),
(:i)(a), (!i) (b), (5)(e) (West 1974
& Cum. Supp. 1979).

No

No minimum

40 to 65

Yes

No

number

I::l

r;:
~

:st'"l

~
t<l

o But see Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 892, 568 P.2d 764, 767 (1977) (bolds 40 to 65 i. protected age group).
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